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ABSTRACT 
The next generation of military capabilities will hinge on systems of 
systems technologies, entailing the integration of numerous large-scale systems 
into a complex system of systems whose capability exceeds the capabilities of 
the individual systems. The increase in capability is due to the emergent 
properties of the system of systems. However, these emergent properties also 
introduce hazards that must be adequately dealt with before the system of 
systems can be employed. The current state of hazard analysis processes is 
insufficient to deal with the complexity and size of a system of systems. This 
thesis aims to define the nature and types of hazards associated with systems of 
systems and to define a technique for identifying specific hazards within a system 
of systems. 
In addition to developing a theoretical process, this thesis applies hazard 
analysis to a real-world case study, the Ballistic Missile Defense System. A 
software application was developed to prove the concept of the hazard analysis 
technique. The technique has been designed from the top down to be compatible 
with current system safety processes and as such, is directly compatible with 
systems of systems currently in development and familiar to practicing system 
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There are currently several large, high-profile Department of Defense 
acquisition programs that are seeking to develop systems of systems to address 
mission needs that might otherwise prove impossible to support. A system of 
systems is an integrated set of systems that uses each system in a coordinated 
fashion to achieve a mission that the individual systems cannot achieve on their 
own. The Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) and the U.S. Army’s Future 
Combat System (FCS) are example of systems of systems. These systems of 
systems are extremely large, complex and hazardous. They employ 
interdependencies that further complicate systems operation. A responsible 
employment of a system of systems requires a system safety program that 
ensures that the risk of employment is tolerable. 
However, system hazard analysis techniques are unable to cope with the 
size or complexity of systems of systems. In addition to being a collection of large 
scale systems, a system of systems is also able to dynamically reconfigure, 
which results in virtually endless system of systems states and configurations. 
New hazard analysis techniques are required to deal with systems of systems. 
These techniques must be capable of handling the large scale of a system of 
systems and produce meaningful results while remaining economically practical. 
In Chapter II, the background to the issue is provided, including the 
characteristics of systems of systems that render most hazard analysis technique 
ineffective and the requirements that any new hazard analysis technique must 
meet. It is here that the problem to be resolved is fully defined. 
Chapter III identifies and defines the types of systems of systems hazards. 
It breaks the full set of hazards down into subcategories that can be more 
manageably addressed. The large scale of systems of systems, and the 
potentially large number of hazards means that the analysis must be subdivided 
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into manageable pieces. This chapter provides the means for doing so by 
subdividing the full set of hazards into coherent hazard types that can be 
addressed individually. 
In Chapter IV, a hazard analysis technique is defined to address a specific 
type of system of systems hazard. This technique will meet the requirements 
outlined in Chapter II. Namely, it must be effective, practical and compatible with 
other hazard analysis techniques. 
The hazard analysis technique defined in Chapter IV will be applied to the 
Ballistic Missile Defense System in Chapter V as a case study. The purpose of 
this case study is to validate the effectiveness of the hazard analysis technique. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this thesis are to: 
(i) identify and define the nature of systems of systems hazards, 
(ii) define a technique that can be used to identify and analyze a 
specific type of system of systems hazard, and 




Perhaps the highest profile, most controversial and most expensive 
Defense program is the Ballistic Missile Defense System, which uses a large 
number of current and developmental systems in a network centric environment 
in order to destroy ballistic missiles in flight. The BMDS is a system of systems, 
as is the U.S. Army’s FCS. These systems of systems are both highly complex 
and hazardous. 
A system of systems is built on systems technology. A system is in itself a 
complex entity. The Ballistic Missile Defense System utilizes the Aegis system, 
which is one of the most complex weapon systems ever acquired by the United 
States Navy. Integration of such a system into a complex network of systems 
only adds to the overall complexity of the BMDS. 
In addition to being highly complex, a system of systems can also be 
hazardous. In fact, all of the mishaps that are possible within the systems are 
also possible within the system of systems, but there are many new causes. In 
order to ensure that the deployed system of systems is safe to operate, a 
technique must be developed to identify the new hazards. 
This chapter provides the background information necessary for the 
research that follows. It will describe the basics of systems and systems of 
systems technology, as well as the issues associated with system safety. The 
system of systems hazard analysis problem will be described, and the questions 
to be answered defined. 
B. SYSTEMS 
1. Overview 
The concept of a system is relatively new. Systems have only been 
purpose-built since the middle of the twentieth century. However, there are some 
examples of systems from the early twentieth century though they were not 
thought of as systems at the time of their creation. As knowledge of science and 
 4
engineering rapidly expanded in the post-war period, engineers sought to take 
advantage of the old adage “the whole is greater than the sum of the parts”. That 
is, to integrate several disciplines and technologies in order to achieve a goal that 
could not be achieved without cooperation. What they sought to develop was a 
system, “a construct or collection of different elements that together produce 
results not obtainable by the elements alone.”1 
Systems have characteristics that set them apart from components, units 
and other products of engineering processes. The IEEE defines a system as: 
[a] set or arrangement of elements [people, products (hardware and 
software) and processes (facilities, equipment, material and 
procedures)] that are related and whose behavior satisfies 
operational needs and provides for the life cycle sustainment of the 
products.2 
From this, it is clear that the characteristics of a system include, but are 
not limited to, a purpose, integrated components and a life cycle.  
2. Characteristics of a System 
a. Purpose 
Man-made systems are constructed to fulfill a specific purpose. 
Systems are expensive and time consuming to develop and should only be 
developed with a specific purpose in mind. In fact, the systems engineering 
process requires that a purpose or role either be known or obtainable.3  
b. Integrated Components 
A system is not merely a product that fulfills a purpose. A system 
utilizes multiple disciplines and technologies to achieve its purpose. Subsystems 
and components are used to harness each of these disciplines. The first products 
to be engineered as systems were the early generation intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBM). The ICBM utilizes liquid or solid fuel rockets, an aerodynamic 
                                            
1 A Consensus of the INCOSE Fellows Retrieved February 27, 2007 from 
http://www.incose.org/practice/fellowsconsensus.aspx. 
2 IEEE 1220-2005 Standard for Application and Management of the Systems Engineering 
Process (2005) §3.1.34. 
3 Ibid., §5.1.1. 
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case with control surfaces, electronic guidance equipment and the warhead. Not 
only are each of these subcomponents highly integrated, they are also highly 
complex in their own right. 
c. Life Cycle 
A system exists for a life cycle. That is, it is conceived, developed, 
produced, used and disposed. Not only does this require a system be designed 
to survive for a long life cycle (e.g. greater than fifty years for the B-52), but 
support systems have to be developed. A system is more than the obvious. It 
includes all of the support systems, procedures, documentation, data and 
personnel required to support it through a full life cycle. 
C. SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS 
1. Overview 
The natural evolution from systems development was to integrate several 
systems into a system of systems. The system of systems concept has taken a 
high profile in recent years due to some large-scale, high-priority Defense 
programs that employ the technology, in particular, the BMDS and FCS. These 
systems of systems take established systems, each with their own purpose and 
with a certain level of autonomy, and attempt to integrate them in order to 
achieve capabilities and both levels of performance and dependability that the 
individual systems cannot achieve on their own. A system of systems is  
an amalgamation of legacy systems and developing systems that 
provide an enhanced military capability greater than any of the 
individual systems within the system of systems.4 
Systems of systems share some characteristics with systems, but there 
are a number of characteristics which distinguish them, and which can lead to 
increased effort through the integration process. Like systems, a system of 
systems is integrated in order to meet a need or to fulfill a purpose and the 
system of systems will exhibit behaviors not present in any of the systems alone. 
However, unlike systems, a system of systems is exponentially more complex. 
                                            
4 D.S. Caffal, and J.B. Michael (2005). Architectural Framework for a System-of-Systems 
IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, pp. 1876-1881. 
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The difference is so significant that systems of systems development is not 
merely a larger version of systems development, but rather a new problem 
altogether. Also, subsystems that are integrated to form a system are unable to 
perform functions individually and are most likely unable to even operate on their 
own. This is not the case for a system of systems, where the systems that make 
up the system of systems are all capable of operating on their own and 
performing functions that may be related to the purpose of the system of 
systems. 
There are a large number of characteristics of a system of systems, more 
than will be discussed here. The characteristics that are discussed here are 
those that have a direct influence on the safety of systems of systems.   
2. Characteristics of a System of Systems 
a. Complexity 
Systems are complex. It logically follows that an integrated set of 
systems will be more so. Systems of systems employ complex interactions and 
dependencies between complex systems and as such, the complexity of a 
system of systems is exponentially greater than the complexity of a system. 
Systems may enter and leave the system of systems, may perform different 
roles, may be connected to one system and not another and then vice versa. The 
states of a system of systems are virtually infinite. This complexity means that 
new analysis techniques are required to manage the sheer size of the problem.5 
b. Emergent Behavior 
A system of systems can perform functions that the component 
systems alone cannot achieve. The difference between what the systems can 
achieve individually and what the system of systems can achieve is termed 
emergent behavior.6 While some emergent behaviors are the desired effect of 
creating a system of systems, they can also cause problems. Some emergent  
 
                                            
5 G. Despotou, R. Alexander, and M. Hall-May (2003). Key Concepts and Characteristics of 
Systems of Systems, Technical Report DARP/BG/2003/1, University of York, §3.4. 
6 Ibid., §3.7. 
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behaviors are intentional, others are not. Unintended emergent behaviors can 
have significant consequences and efforts must be made to ensure that the 
consequences are minimized.7 
c. Autonomy 
A system is constructed of components that are unable to operate 
on their own, and even if they could, they would not fulfill a useful purpose. In 
contrast, a system of systems is constructed of systems that operate on their 
own on a regular basis and are able to perform functions independently that may 
be unrelated to the functions of the system of systems.8  
D. HAZARDS 
1. Overview 
There is risk associated with the operation of systems and systems of 
systems. The risk is associated with the hazards present in the system or system 
of systems. When dealing with systems, the terminology used by engineers to 
describe risk can have meanings that are contrary to the common usage of the 
terms in other contexts. What follows is an overview of the most important terms. 
2. Terminology 
a. Failure 
A failure is an instance of a system, unit or component not 
operating as designed. Failures may be overt (that is, the effects may be known 
to operators or other system components) or insidious (that is, the effects of the 
failure are not detected). 
b. Fault 
A fault is a design or manufacturing flaw that exists within a system 
or component that may or may not have caused a failure. Faults may be present 
within a system for extended periods of time before manifesting as a failure. For 
example, a crack in a metal brace is a fault. It becomes a failure when the crack 
grows to the size where the brace breaks.  
                                            
7 G. Despotou, R. Alexander, and M. Hall-May (2003). Key Concepts and Characteristics of 
Systems of Systems, Technical Report DARP/BG/2003/1, University of York, §3.7. 
8 Ibid., §3.1. 
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c. Mishap 
A mishap, or accident, is an event that causes injury or death to 
personnel, loss or damage to property, or damage to the environment.9 Most 
systems control or produce some form of energy. A mishap is an uncontrolled 
release of that energy. For example, a nuclear meltdown is an uncontrolled 
release of nuclear energy and is a mishap associated with a nuclear power plant. 
An aircraft crash is the uncontrolled release of the potential energy associated 
with being at altitude. However, not all uncontrolled releases of energy are 
mishaps. The release must cause damage. An uncontrolled release of energy 
that does not cause damage is a ‘near miss’ and may have, under different 
circumstances, caused damage.10 When defining a mishap, the type of energy 
release and the victim (personnel, property or the environment) must be defined. 
The conditions that lead to the mishap are not part of the mishap definition. 
Instead, they form part of the hazard definition. 
d. Hazard 
Hazard is a term in common usage that has a different meaning 
within systems terminology. In common usage, a hazard is a potential danger. 
For example, in golf, a hazard is a sand bunker or water feature that the player 
wishes to avoid. Within systems terminology, a hazard is more than just the 
potential danger. A full description of a hazard must also include the conditions 
that can lead to the mishap. A systems definition of a hazard within the golfing 
context would be that the ball is close enough to the hazard to induce the player 
into choosing to hit over it and that the ball does not make it over due to a 
significant head wind. A hazard is a set of conditions that may lead to a mishap, 
not just the potential danger. MIL-STD-882D defines a hazard as: 
                                            
9 MIL-STD-882D Standard Practice for System Safety (2000) §3.2.6. 
10 N. Leveson (1995). Safeware: System Safety and Computers Boston: Addison Wesley, p. 
176. 
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[a]ny real or potential condition that can cause injury, illness or 
death to personnel; damage to or loss of a system, equipment or 
property; or damage to the environment. [emphasis added]11 
e. Hazard Causal Factor 
A hazard causal factor is an event, condition, failure, fault or any 
other aspect that is a required for a hazard to occur. 
f. Mishap Risk 
Mishap risk is a somewhat confusing term. By strict definition, 
mishap risk is: 
[a]n expression of the impact and possibility of a mishap in terms of 
potential mishap severity and probability of occurrence.12 
However, it is difficult to assign a probability of occurrence to a 
mishap alone. The hazards that can lead to that mishap must be known in order 
to know the conditions and events that lead to the mishap. It is the conditions and 
events that have a probability of occurrence. The probability of occurrence of a 
mishap is a function of the probability of occurrence of the hazards that lead to 
the mishap. While it is possible to generate the probability of occurrence of a 
mishap from the hazards that lead to the mishap (and there are likely to be 
several hazards), it is more useful to leave the probability of occurrence at the 
hazard level. For example, a nuclear meltdown can occur either due to a control 
rod failure, or due to a failure of the pumps that circulate the coolant. The mishap 
is the nuclear meltdown, and the mishap probability is the probability that either 
the control rods fail or the pumps fail. To reduce the probability of a nuclear 
meltdown, you must address either the probability of control rod failure or the 
probability of pump failure.  
As such, in general practice, a mishap risk is calculated for a 
hazard, not a mishap. The mishap risk (or hazard risk) is an expression of the 
severity of the mishap caused by the hazard and the probability of occurrence of 
the conditions that lead to the hazard.  
                                            
11 MIL-STD-882D Standard Practice for System Safety (2000) §3.2.3. 
12 Ibid., §3.2.7. 
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g. Residual Mishap Risk 
The residual mishap risk is the risk that exists in the fielded 
system.13 Once the hazards of a system have been identified, effort is made to 
ensure that each of these hazards is acceptable. The system design may be 
changed, or changes made to the operating procedure in an effort to reduce the 
probability or consequence of a hazard. Once all these efforts have been 
employed, there is still risk left in the system. This is the residual mishap risk. 
Residual mishap risk is an important concept as it is this risk that is accepted by 
the system operator or developer. In general, there is a threshold for residual 
mishap risk. Above a certain level, the risk of operating a system (the residual 
mishap risk) may not outweigh the benefits of operating the system. 
E. SYSTEM SAFETY 
1. Overview 
Systems are inherently dangerous. Almost without exception, a system 
will control some type of dangerous force, be it electrical, chemical, potential or 
nuclear. Systems engineering focuses primarily on developing system 
performance and function, occasionally to the detriment of safety. System safety 
is a program that runs concurrently with systems engineering that aims to 
increase the safety of a system while still permitting system function. Systems 
safety engineering is a specialty on its own, and most defense acquisition 
programs require a system safety program by regulation. It is a complex 
discipline that can take substantial resources, but it has proven to increase the 
safety of deployed systems.14 
                                            
13 MIL-STD-882D Standard Practice for System Safety (2000) §3.2.9. 




MIL-STD-882D defines safety as: 
[f]reedom from those conditions that can cause death, injury, 
occupational illness, damage to or loss of equipment or property, or 
damage to the environment.15 
For the most part, developing and employing a system involves exposure 
to these conditions. The only way of avoiding this is to avoid the system. For 
example, irrespective of how it is designed and built, there is always a chance 
that an aircraft will crash. Successful employment of a system involves not only 
recognizing the exposure (intentional or otherwise) to these conditions, but also 
employing active techniques to minimize the likelihood or impact of these 
conditions. 
3. How Safe is Safe Enough? 
There is risk in everything we do. Driving a motor vehicle is a particularly 
dangerous activity, and yet it is done by millions everyday. BASE jumping is also 
a particularly dangerous activity, but this activity is undertaken by far fewer 
people. The decision is based upon an assessment of risk versus reward or 
necessity. Driving a motor vehicle is an essential task, and hence the risks 
involved are readily undertaken. BASE jumping is not an essential task, and 
hence it is only undertaken by those who view the benefit of the thrill worth the 
risks involved. When dealing with systems, it is not possible to remove all risk. 
The point at which a system becomes safe enough is the point at which the 
benefit of the system outweighs the risks. This will vary not only with the type of 
system involved, but also on the role of the system. For example, military aircraft 
operations will accept much higher levels of risk during a time of conflict than 
during training exercises. 
4. System Safety Objectives 
According to Leveson, there are two system safety objectives: either to 
“make something safer,” or “to convince a government licenser that it is already 
                                            
15 MIL-STD-882D Standard Practice for System Safety (2000) §3.2.10. 
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safe.”16 In many instances, there are government regulations that require the 
developer or operator of a system to conclusively demonstrate that a system 
meets a mandated safety level. For example, the Federal Aviation Administration 
mandates failure probability objectives for aircraft that operate within the United 
States. If it cannot be demonstrated that an aircraft type meets these objectives, 
then the aircraft cannot be operated. Alternatively, the developer of a system 
may employ system safety techniques in order to make its product safer, usually 
for economic reasons. For example, a developer of electronic products may 
choose to invest in a system safety program in the hope that it will reduce the 
cost of lawsuits due to accidents, or a car manufacturer may seek to make their 
vehicles safer in order to make them more attractive to consumers, and hence 
increase sales. 
5. A System Safety Process 
a. Overview 
The system safety process is a specific application of the risk 
management process with the objective of increasing the safety of the system. 
Although there are numerous system safety standards, the variations to the core 
process are minimal. For the purpose of this research, the system safety process 
defined by MIL-STD-882D Standard Practice for System Safety will be used. This 
process is shown in Figure 1, and described below. 
 
 
Figure 1. MIL-STD-882D System Safety Process 
 
b. Documentation of the System Safety Approach 
The system safety approach must be documented and approved by 
program authorities. The documentation must identify each hazard analysis and 
                                            
16 N. Leveson (1995). Safeware: System Safety and Computers Boston: Addison Wesley, p. 
152. 
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mishap risk assessment process to be used and must also indicate how the 
system safety program integrates into the overall system program. The 
documentation also defines how risks are communicated to and accepted by the 
appropriate authority and the method for tracking hazards and residual mishap 
risk.17 
c. Identification of Hazards 
Hazards must be identified through a systematic hazard analysis 
process. All aspects of the system must be considered, including the hardware, 
the software, the environment and the system purpose, over all phases of the 
system life cycle. Identification of hazards is a collaborative process that involves 
all program members.18  
d. Assessment of Mishap Risk 
Once each hazard has been identified, the probability that the 
hazard will occur and the consequence of occurrence must be determined. 
Probabilities may be determined qualitatively. When determining consequence, 
the effect on people, property and the environment must be considered. The 
probability and consequence can be combined into a mishap risk priority index.19 
e. Identification of Mishap Risk Mitigation Measures 
Measures that reduce the mishap risk must be identified for each 
hazard with an unacceptable risk level. Each of these measures should be 
assessed to determine its level of effectiveness in reducing mishap risk. In 
general, risks should be mitigated in accordance with the safety design order of 
precedence:20 
(i) Eliminate hazards through design selection, 
(ii) Incorporate safety devices, 
(iii) Provide warning devices, and 
(iv) Develop procedures and training. 
                                            
17 MIL-STD-882D. Standard Practice for System Safety (2000) §4.1. 
18 Ibid., §4.2. 
19 Ibid., §4.3. 
20 Ibid., §4.4. 
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f. Reduction of Mishap Risk to an Acceptable Level 
Once the most appropriate measures for mitigating mishap risk 
have been identified, the measures must be implemented. This may involve 
creating and adding safety requirements to the system specification, making 
changes to the system design or developing training procedures that avoid 
hazards.21 
g. Verification of Mishap Risk Reduction 
Any mishap risk reduction that has been performed must be verified 
by analysis, inspection or test in order to ensure that the desired effect has been 
achieved.22 
h. Review of Hazards and Acceptance of Residual Mishap 
Risk 
At the completion of the mishap risk reduction activities, the 
appropriate authority must review the system hazards and accept the residual 
mishap risk. The residual mishap risk is the risk that remains once all mishap risk 
mitigation strategies have been employed. If the appropriate authority is unable 
to accept the residual mishap risk, further mishap risk reduction measures need 
to be employed.23 
i. Tracking of Hazards and Residual Mishap Risk 
The hazards and residual mishap risk must be tracked as the 
system evolves throughout the life cycle. This includes updating probability 
assessments if they prove to be erroneous, adding or removing hazards as the 
system is modified and tracking closure actions to ensure they are completed.24 
F. SYSTEM HAZARD ANALYSES 
1. Overview 
The primary task within a system safety program is a hazard analysis. 
Hazard analyses can be performed at different times within the system life cycle, 
at different levels within the system design and for the purpose of identifying                                             
21 MIL-STD-882D. Standard Practice for System Safety (2000) §4.5. 
22 Ibid., §4.6. 
23 Ibid.,  §4.7. 
24 Ibid., §4.8. 
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different types of hazards. A system safety program should be designed for a 
specific application, and is likely to include a number of different hazard analyses 
and several techniques for performing each hazard analysis. The most common 
hazard analysis is a system hazard analysis, which commences early in the life 
cycle (as soon as sufficient data is available for the relevant hazard analysis 
technique) and continues as the system evolves. A system hazard analysis deals 
with hazards at the system level (as opposed to the subsystem or unit level). 
There are a large number of system hazard analysis techniques, the most 
common of which are described below.  
2. System Hazard Analysis Objectives 
The purpose of a system hazard analysis is to identify and assess 
system-level hazards. System-level hazards are primarily hazards associated 
with the interfaces and interactions between subsystems, but may also include 
potentially safety-critical human errors.25 There are a large number of techniques 
for conducting a system hazard analysis. Any system hazard analysis technique 
must not only be able to identify hazards in a cost-effective fashion, it must also 
employ a formal approach that either provides complete coverage of the system, 
or clearly identifies the aspects of the system that have not been analyzed. The 
choice of a system hazard analysis technique is application specific, and will 
depend upon the criticality and complexity of the system as well as the amount of 
system information that is available. Several commonly used system hazard 
analysis techniques are described below. 
The primary output of a system hazard analysis is a system hazard 
analysis report. This report is effectively a list of all system hazards, including an 
assessment of the risk associated with each hazard and the recommended 




                                            
25 National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (1999). System Safety Handbook 
(DHB-S-001) Edwards, CA: Dryden Research Flight Center, p. 28. 
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analysis report is shown in Table 1. Any system hazard analysis technique must 
be able to populate such a table. The data to be included in the table is as 
follows:26 
(i) System/Subsystem/Unit. List every system, subsystem and unit to 
be analyzed. 
(ii) Component Failure Mode. For each system, subsystem and unit, 
list all failure modes that can result in a hazard. 
(iii) Hazard Description. Describe the hazard that results from each 
component failure mode. 
(iv) Effect of Hazard. Determine the effect of each hazard in terms of 
the damage that the subsequent mishap may cause to personnel, 
property or the environment. 
(v) Risk Assessment. Determine the risk of each hazard in terms of 
severity and probability before any hazard mitigation activities have 
been conducted. 
(vi) Recommended Action. Identify the actions that must be taken in 
order to reduce the hazard risk to an acceptable level. 
(vii) Effect of Recommended Action. Determine the risk of each 











































close on failure. 
Marginal 
Remote 
… … … … … … … 
Table 1. Example System Hazard Analysis Report 
 
3. System Hazard Analysis Techniques 
a. Fault Tree Analysis 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a top-down approach to identifying the 
causes of system hazards. The process requires knowledge of substantial 
                                            
26 Office of Management and Budget. (1995). System Safety Hazard Analysis Report 
(DI-SAFT-80101B) Washington, DC. 
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system detail, and cannot be performed completely early in the process 
(although it can be commenced and still prove fruitful), but does provide full 
system coverage, permits quantitative analysis and combinations of failures, and 
is very cost effective in identifying system hazards. An overview of the process is 
shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Fault Tree Analysis Process27 
 
The steps are as follows: 
(i) Identify FTA Objective. Establish the purpose of the analysis and 
the types of mishaps to be analyzed. The objective may be to 
determine the probability of a mishap occurring, or to determine the 
most effective method of reducing a mishaps probability. 
(ii) Define Fault Tree (FT) Top Event. Identify the system mishap to 
be analyzed within a specific fault tree. The fault tree will identify 
the causes and probability of the chosen mishap. 
(iii) Define FTA Scope. Determine which systems will be included as 
contributors to the system mishap, and which will be excluded, as 
well as the version of the system to be analyzed and the system 
boundary conditions such as initial states and input ranges. 
(iv) Define FTA Resolution. Determine the level to which the failure 
causes for the top event will be developed. The objective of the 
FTA may be achieved by developing the FT to the subsystem level, 
or it may require that the unit level be considered. 
                                            
27 From National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (2002). Fault Tree Handbook with 
Aerospace Applications (Version 1.1) Washington, DC: NASA Office of Safety and Mission 
Assurance, p. 22. 
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(v) Define FTA Ground Rules. Establish a consistent method for 
naming FT events and gates. 
(vi) Construct FT. Starting with the top event, define the combination 
of lower level failures or events that will cause the top event to 
occur. If the top event is a system level mishap, the first level of 
failures will be at the subsystem level, the second level at the unit 
level and so on. Continue to decompose lower level events until the 
FTA objective can be achieved. 
(vii) Evaluate FT. Evaluate the FT qualitatively and quantitatively. A 
qualitative analysis will determine subsets of events that can cause 
the top event (not every event within a FT is required to cause the 
top event) and will identify events whose elimination will prevent the 
top event. A quantitative analysis can determine the overall 
probability of the top event and the probability of each of the 
subsets that cause the top event. 
(viii) Interpret/Present Results. Assess the importance of the FTA 
results and report them to the relevant decision maker. 
An example fault tree is shown in Figure 3. The top event is the 
‘System Mishap’. The fault tree shows that the system mishap can be caused by 
either a combination of failures F1 and F2, or by a combination of failures F3 and 
F4. In order to prevent the system mishap, one of failures F1 or F2 and one of 
failures F3 or F4 must be prevented. Preventing failure F1 alone does not prevent 
the system mishap. Depending upon the objective of the FTA, the FT may be 
further broken down. For example, failure F4 may actually be the combination of 
several failures within the subsystem that exhibits failure F4. 
Fault tree analysis is one of the most efficient system hazard 
analysis techniques. The process begins with a system mishap, and then 
expands upon the causes of that system mishap. Every step of the FTA is 
therefore guaranteed to provide further insight into a system mishap. This is not 
true of other system hazard analysis processes that do not employ the top down 
approach. With a bottom up approach, significant effort may be expended 
analyzing a subsystem failure that does not result in a system mishap.  
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Figure 3. Fault Tree Analysis Example 
 
b. Event Tree Analysis 
Event tree analysis is a bottom-up hazard analysis technique that 
seeks to determine the consequences of a given subsystem or unit failure. It can 
be visualized as the reverse of a Fault Tree Analysis. The process that is shown 
in Figure 2 can also be applied to an Event Tree Analysis. However, rather than 
starting with a top event, Event Tree Analysis starts with a component failure or 
partial performance. Figure 4 shows an example Event Tree Analysis. The 
purpose of this tree is to determine the outcome of a ‘Component 1 Failure.’ 
Other events in the tree are the components that either depend upon Component 




Figure 4. Event Tree Analysis Example 
 
Event Tree Analysis should only be used for specific purposes, 
when the outcome of a component’s failure is essential to know, or if the 
probability of failure of a particular component is high. Event Tree Analysis 
should not be used to cover the entire system, as it has some significant flaws. 
Firstly, it cannot deal with unrelated initiating failures that may compound further 
along the failure chain. Secondly, a significant amount of effort can be expended 
on Event Tree Analyses that provide no fruitful results. A long and complicated 
Event Tree Analysis may actually result in no hazards being identified. Event 
Tree Analyses should be used to supplement other hazard analysis techniques.28 
c. Hazards and Operability Analysis 
Hazards and Operability (HAZOP) Analysis applies a systematic 
exploration of system parameters and the manner in which they can fail. For 
each system parameter, a list of guide words is applied in order to determine how 
the system may fail and what the effects of that failure are. The HAZOP process 
is summarized in Table 2, but the backbone of the process is: 
Guide Word + Parameter = Deviation29 
For example, when dealing with a coolant system, the parameter 
may be “Flow” and the guide word could be “None,” which results in the 
deviation, “No Flow”. Other guide words could be more, reverse, less, etc.  
                                            
28 C. Ericson (2005). Hazard Analysis Techniques for System Safety Hoboken, NJ: 
Wiley-Interscience, p. 233. 
29 Ibid., p. 369. 
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Step Task Description 
1 Define System 
Define, scope and bound the system. Define the mission, 
mission phases and mission environments. Understand the 
system design and operation. Note that all steps are 
applicable for a software HAZOP. 
2 Plan HAZOP 
Establish HAZOP analysis goals, definitions, worksheets, 
schedule and process. Divide the system under analysis into 
the smallest segments desired for the analysis. Identify items 
to be analyzed and establish indenture levels for 
items/functions to be analyzed. 
3 Select Team 
Select team leader and all team members to participate in 
HAZOP analysis and establish responsibilities. Utilize team 
member expertise from several different disciplines (e.g. 
design, test, manufacturing, etc.). 
4 Acquire Data 
Acquire all of the necessary design and process data needed 
(e.g., functional diagrams, code, schematics and drawings) 
for the system, subsystems and functions. Refine the system 
information and design representation for HAZOP analysis. 
5 Conduct HAZOP 
a. Identify and list the items to be evaluated. 
b. Establish and define the appropriate parameter list. 
c. Establish and define the appropriate guideword list. 
d. Establish the HAZOP analysis worksheet. 
e. Conduct the HAZOP analysis meetings. 
f. Record the HAZOP analysis results on the HAZOP 
worksheets. 
g. Have the HAZOP analysis worksheets validated by a 
system engineer for correctness. 
6 Recommend Corrective Action 
Recommend corrective action for hazards with unacceptable 
risk. Assign responsibility and schedule for implementing 
corrective action. 
7 Monitor Corrective Action 
Review the HAZOP at scheduled intervals to ensure that 
corrective action is being implemented. 
8 Track Hazards Transfer identified hazards into the hazard tracking system. 
9 Document Hazop 
Document the entire HAZOP process on the worksheets. 
Update for new information and closure of assigned 
corrective actions. 
Table 2. HAZOP Process30 
                                            
30 From C. Ericson (2005). Hazard Analysis Techniques for System Safety Hoboken, NJ: 
Wiley-Interscience, p. 369. 
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The choice of guide words is dependent upon the system to be 
analyzed. For most applications, there are lists of guide words that have 
historically proven to be effective in identifying hazards. An example list of guide 
words for software and system interfaces is shown in Table 3. 
 
Guide Word Meaning 
None Intended result not achieved 
More Too much of some parameter 
Less Not enough of a parameter 
As Well As Unintended activity or material 
Part Of Parts of the parameter are missing 
Reverse Value is opposite of intended value 
Other Than Something other than intended result happens 
Omission Intended output missing 
Commission Unintended output 
Early Output occurs too soon 
Late Output occurs too late 
Coarse Incorrect Output’s value is wrong 
Subtle Incorrect Output’s value is wrong, but cannot be detected 
Table 3. HAZOP Guide Words for Software or System Interface 
Analysis31 
 
The HAZOP process provides a systematic approach to identifying 
system hazards by ensuring that all system parameters and all failure modes are 
addressed, as well as providing structure to brainstorming sessions. However, it 
                                            
31 J. Reese, and N. Leveson (1997). Software Deviation Analysis Proceedings of the 19th 
International Conference on Software Engineering pp. 250-260. 
 23
does have some limitations, namely that it does not consider multiple event 
failures, it can take considerable effort and time to complete, and a poor choice 
of guide words can result in some hazards being overlooked.32 
G. SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS HAZARD ANALYSIS AND THE SYSTEM 
SAFETY PROCESS 
1. Overview 
A system of systems hazard analysis should be conducted within the 
system safety program in order to maximize compatibility with system hazard 
analyses and to minimize the impact on the training, experience and knowledge 
base of the system safety engineering community. Some or all of the activities 
within the system safety process may not be capable of handling the size and 
complexity of a system of systems. Each of the system safety process steps will 
be assessed to determine whether a new process will be required for that step to 
accommodate systems of systems. 
2. Documentation of the System Safety Approach 
The documentation of the system safety approach for a system of systems 
can be developed in the same manner as the documentation for a system. 
Although the actual approach to be documented will differ, the list of elements to 
be documented remains the same; that is, the documentation must still cover the 
hazard analysis and mishap risk assessment processes, as well as the means 
for communicating risk, and so on. Documentation of the system safety approach 
does not require a new process in order to be applied to systems of systems. 
3. Identification of Hazards 
Systems of systems hazards cannot be economically and systematically 
identified by any established hazard identification process. This is due to the size 
and complexity of systems of systems. Hazard identification processes, such as 
HAZOP, require engineers to analyze each aspect of the system by hand to 
determine what hazards may exist. While this could be done for a system of 
systems, it is not practical as it would take a very long time. Not only are systems 
                                            
32 C. Ericson (2005). Hazard Analysis Techniques for System Safety Hoboken, NJ: 
Wiley-Interscience, pp. 376 – 379. 
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of systems exponentially larger and more complex than systems, they also have 
a large number of configurations, each of which must be analyzed individually. 
Identification of hazards requires a new process in order to be applied to systems 
of systems. 
In addition, it is difficult to determine the emergent behaviors of a system 
of systems before the systems are integrated. As such, the hazards that are 
associated with the emergent behaviors cannot be determined until the system is 
integrated. 
4. Assessment of Mishap Risk 
The assessment of mishap risk is dependent upon how the hazards are 
identified. Given that systems of systems will require a new process in order to 
identify hazards, it is therefore also true that systems of systems will require a 
new process to assess the mishap risk. However, the basic structure of the 
assessment should not change. That is, each hazard should be assigned a 
qualitative probability and consequence in a manner consistent with a systems 
assessment. This will allow direct comparisons between hazards identified by 
any new process and hazards identified by an established process. Assessment 
of mishap risk will require a new process in order to be applied to systems of 
systems. 
5. Identification of Mishap Risk Mitigation Measures 
The measures that may be used to mitigate system of systems hazard risk 
are similar to those used to mitigate system hazard risk. There may, however, be 
more aspects of the hazard to attack given the increased complexity of systems 
of systems hazards. Identification of mishap risk mitigation measures does not 
require any new processes or measures in order to be applied to systems of 
systems. 
6. Reduction of Mishap Risk to an Acceptable Level 
The mishap risk reduction measures can be implemented for systems of 
systems in the same manner as for systems. The effort required to mitigate a 
complex system of systems hazard may be more than that required to mitigate a 
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system hazard, but the methods to be applied are the same. That is, safety 
requirements can still be added to system specifications, the design can still be 
changed to reduce the hazard probability and training procedures can still be 
implemented. Reduction of mishap risk to an acceptable level does not require 
any new processes in order to be applied to systems of systems. 
7. Verification of Mishap Risk Reduction 
Verification of mishap risk reduction techniques are the same for systems 
of systems as they are for systems. Analysis, inspection and test are all valid 
methods for verifying system of systems hazard risk reduction. Verification of 
mishap risk reduction does not require any new processes in order to be applied 
to systems of systems. 
8. Review of Hazards and Acceptance of Residual Mishap Risk 
An appropriate authority must accept the residual mishap risk for a system 
of systems. However, the size and complexity of a system of systems means 
that, unlike a system, a hazard analysis is unlikely to be complete. It is thus 
difficult to know what the residual risk is. For a system, the residual risk is clearly 
defined by the identified hazards and the knowledge that the hazard assessment 
is complete. For a system of systems, an estimate of the residual risk must be 
made with the knowledge that the hazard assessment is likely to be incomplete. 
Review of hazards and acceptance of residual mishap risk will require a new 
process in order to be applied to systems of systems. 
9. Tracking of Hazards and Residual Mishap Risk 
Tracking of hazards and residual mishap risk is significantly more difficult 
for systems of systems than it is for systems. Modifications to a system within a 
system of systems may have far reaching and unknown effects on the hazard 
space of the system of systems, far beyond the extent of the localized 
modification. In order for the hazards of a system of systems to be tracked 
efficiently throughout the lifecycle, a new process is required. 
10. Conclusion 
The hazard assessment of systems of systems should fit within the 
system safety process. In order for this to occur, several new processes are 
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required to complete some of the steps within the system safety process; other 
steps can be completed without any new processes. In order to complete the 
system safety process for a system of systems, new processes are required for: 
(i) Identification of hazards, 
(ii) Assessment of mishap risk, 
(iii) Review of hazards and acceptance of residual mishap risk, and 
(iv) Tracking of hazards and residual mishap risk. 
H. THE PROBLEM 
A system of systems is typically a hazardous and extremely complex 
entity that must be engineered to meet acceptable safety standards. The size 
and complexity of a system of systems is such that system hazard analysis 
techniques are not effective.33 New hazard analysis techniques must be 
developed that are able to deal with the size and complexity of a system of 
systems, that can keep pace with the evolution of a system of systems over the 
life cycle and that can either cover the full scope of a system of systems or 
conducts the analysis in such a way that it is clear what aspects of the system of 
systems have not been assessed and what the residual mishap risk is. 
I. CONCLUSION 
Systems of systems are complex and hazardous entities. The complexity 
of a system of systems is sufficient to render system hazard analysis techniques 
incapable of providing full coverage, and thus applying these techniques may 
leave some hazards undetected. A new hazard analysis technique is required. 
The new hazard analysis technique must fit within the system safety 
program framework. For some steps of the system safety process, there are 
established techniques available that can be applied to systems of systems. The 
following steps need new techniques to be developed: 
 
 
                                            
33 B. Michael, A. Nerode, and D. Wijesekera (2006). On the Provision of Safety Assurance 
via Safety Kernels for Modern Weapon Systems Proceedings of the Fifth Workshop on Software 
Assessment p. 103. 
 27
(i) Identification of hazards, 
(ii) Assessment of mishap risk, 
(iii) Review of hazards and acceptance of residual mishap risk, and 
(iv) Tracking of hazards and residual mishap risk. 
In the following chapters, a hazard analysis technique will be developed 
that can identify certain types of systems of systems hazards. This technique will 
then be applied to the Ballistic Missile Defense System in order to validate the 
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III. SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS HAZARDS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to effectively identify, analyze and mitigate systems of systems 
hazards, the type and nature of these hazards must first be defined. This chapter 
will describe the nature of the systems of systems hazard space and then break 
systems of systems hazards down into subtypes that can be directly addressed 
with identification and analysis techniques. 
B. SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS HAZARD SPACE 
A system of systems introduces new hazards that are not present in the 
individual systems. These hazards are varied and complex, significantly more so 
than the individual system hazards. In order to determine what hazards are 
present in a system of systems, it must first be determined what type of hazards 
may be present. 
Organization of a set of systems into a system of systems creates 
emergent behavior, but does not change the physical nature of the component 
systems. For a mishap to occur a system must control or create energy and that 
energy must be released in an unsafe manner. Integrating a set of systems does 
not introduce any new energy sources. As such, no new potential mishaps are 
introduced. More specifically: 
{System of Systems Mishaps} = Union of {System Mishaps} 
Note that while the potential mishaps do not change, the probability that a 
mishap will occur may be changed dramatically. A mishap that is bordering on 
impossible within a single system may be significantly more probable when 
combined into a system of systems. In addition, the emergent behaviors of the 
system of systems create new means by which the mishaps can occur, that is, 
they create new hazards.  
{System of Systems Hazards} ≠ Union of {System Hazards} 
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These relationships are not new; they are an extension of the relationships 
between a system and its integrated components. A system of systems is similar 
to a system in that they both entail the integration of less complex components or 
systems into a more complex system or system of systems that exhibits 
emergent behaviors that the components or systems cannot perform on their 
own. 
As an example, consider the simplest of interactions between a forward 
observer (such as an AWAC aircraft) that is providing target data to a destroyer 
armed with Tomahawk surface to surface missiles. The destroyer has the 
potential to launch a Tomahawk against the wrong target which, if the location 
turns out to be civilian or friendly, results in a mishap. This mishap can occur 
whether or not the destroyer is part of the larger system of systems. However, if 
the destroyer is not part of the larger system of systems, a launch against an 
incorrect target must be caused within the destroyer system. Once the destroyer 
becomes part of the system of systems, there are new ways that the erroneous 
launch can occur. That is, the forward observer can provide incorrect target 
information to the destroyer. The creation of the system of systems (albeit 
simple) has not introduced a new mishap, but it has introduced a new hazard. 
The theoretical hazard space of a system of systems is shown 
diagrammatically in Figure 5. Each system that is part of a system of systems 
brings with it its own hazards. That is, the hazard space of System of Systems 1 
is at least equal to the hazard space of individual systems A, B and C. Each of 
the hazards present in these systems may still occur within a system of systems 
context and are hence part of the set of system of systems hazards. However, 
there are also hazards within the system of systems that cannot be allocated to a 
single system. These are emergent hazards. In the above example, when a 
forward observer provides incorrect target data to a destroyer, and the destroyer 
launches a Tomahawk at the incorrect target, the resultant hazard cannot be 
solely attributed to either the forward observer or the destroyer. It is a hazard that 
belongs to the system of systems. 
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Figure 5 also demonstrates that system of systems hazards are context 
dependent. One of the advantages of a system of systems is that it is 
reconfigurable, both dynamically and through system replacement, removal or 
addition. This allows the system of systems to adapt to changing functional 
requirements or operational scenarios. For example, consider if System of 
Systems 1 is reconfigured such that System A is replaced by System E and 
System F is added. The hazard space is now altered to System of Systems 2. 
While the core of the System of Systems (Systems B and C) remains the same, 
and the function may remain ostensibly the same, the hazard space has been 
altered dramatically. In addition to the new hazards introduced by the new 










C. TYPES OF SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS HAZARDS 
1. Overview 
Given that a system of systems introduces new hazards that are not 
present in the component systems, it must be determined what types of hazards 
are introduced. It is evidently possible for a system of systems hazard to be 
extremely complex. The more that is known about the types of hazards that may 
exist, the more likely it is that the hazards that do exist will be found. 
Systems of systems hazards are easily separable into two distinct 
categories, single system hazards and emergent hazards. A single system 
hazard is a hazard that is attributable to a single system alone, an emergent 
hazard is a hazard that results from the integration of several systems into a 
system of systems and hence cannot be attributed to a single system. Emergent 
hazards can be further subdivided into reconfiguration hazards, integration 
hazards and interoperability hazards. The taxonomy of systems of systems 
hazards is shown in Figure 6. These hazard types are further defined below. 
Definition: A system of systems hazard is any hazard that may occur 
within a system of systems. 
Definition: An emergent hazard is any hazard that may occur within a 




Figure 6. Systems of Systems Hazard Taxonomy 
 
2. Single System Hazards 
A single system hazard is a hazard that is attributable to a single system 
alone. These hazards are identified by the system hazard analysis process and 
are outside the scope of a system of systems hazard analysis. The purpose of a 
system of systems hazard analysis is to identify all systems of systems hazard 
except for single system hazards. 
Definition: A single system hazard is any hazard that may occur within a 
system of systems that is attributable to a single system and may occur whether 
or not that system is operating within the system of systems context. 
3. Integration Hazards 
a. Overview 
Integration hazards are a type of emergent hazard that result from 
the integration of systems into a system of systems. The vast majority of systems 
of systems hazards are integration hazards, which can be further subcategorized 
into three types, interface hazards, proximity hazards and resource hazards. 
b. Interface Hazards 
Definition: An interface hazard is a hazard in which one system 
causes a mishap in another system by transferring a failure or partial 
performance over a defined interface, possibly through another system. 
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 The dependency between systems within a system of systems can 
result in a failure in one system causing a mishap in another. What may be a 
benign failure in one system may be catastrophic when transferred to another. 
Figure 7 shows several ways in which a failure in one or more systems can have 
an adverse effect on another. In the top example, a failure in System A is 
transferred to System B, which suffers a mishap. In the middle example, a failure 
occurs in System C that causes a dependent failure in System D, which then 
causes a mishap in System E. In the lower example, failures occur in both 
Systems F and H and combine to form a mishap in System G. Within a system of 
systems, there are enumerable ways in which system failures can combine to 
cause mishaps. Fortunately, the types of failures which can be transferred are 
limited by the interfaces between systems. 
 
 
Figure 7. Interface Hazard Examples 
 
A real life example of an interface hazard within a system of 
systems was the unfortunate shooting down of two U.S. Army Blackhawk 
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helicopters over Iraq by two U.S. Air Force F-15s. The Blackhawk helicopters 
were present in the No-Fly zone when the F-15s commenced their patrol. The 
F-15s were unable to positively identify the helicopters, which appeared as an 
unidentified contact on their radar screens. There was an Airborne Warning and 
Control (AWAC) aircraft in the region that also had contact with the helicopters. 
Although the AWAC aircraft correctly identified the helicopters as friendly, when 
the information was passed to the F-15s the helicopters were designated as 
unidentified. Based on this information, the F-15s destroyed the Blackhawk 
helicopters.34 
The Blackhawk friendly fire incident is an example of an interface 
hazard. Although there were other contributing causes (not discussed), a 
significant contributing factor was the dependence of the F-15 upon the AWAC 
aircraft. The failure within the AWAC aircraft (misidentifying the radar contact) 
was transferred to the F-15 via a defined interface (in this instance, radio 
communications). A diagrammatic representation of this incident as an interface 
hazard is shown in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8. Interface Hazard Model of the Blackhawk Friendly Fire Incident 
                                            
34 R. Alexander, M. Hall-May, and T. Kelly (2004). Characterisation of Systems of Systems 
Failures. Proceedings of the 22nd Annual System Safety Conference. Unionville, VA, System 
Safety Society. 
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c. Proximity Hazards 
Definition: A proximity hazard is a hazard in one system that is 
caused by the operation, failure or partial performance of another system that is 
transferred to the victim system by a means other than a defined interface. 
A system of systems utilizes a network of systems that is, more 
often than not, geographically distributed. However, the systems of a system of 
systems operate with a certain amount of autonomy. As such, it is possible that 
systems may come within close physical proximity of one another. In some 
systems of systems, systems may come in close proximity as a part of regular 
operations. An interface hazard occurs when one system adversely affects 
another system via a defined interface. When systems come within close35 
proximity of each other, it is possible for one system to adversely affect another 
system without using a defined interface. This is a proximity hazard. 
Figure 9 demonstrates the concept of a proximity hazard. System B 
radiates some form of energy. This radiation may be the result of a failure, but 
may also be the result of normal operation. Systems A1 and A2 are identical 
systems. System A1 suffers a mishap as it is close enough to System B to suffer 
adverse effects. System A2 does not suffer a mishap as it sufficiently removed 
from System B to avoid the propagated energy. The types of propagated energy 
that may cause mishaps in other systems are many and varied, but likely 
suspects are electromagnetic energy, heat or gas from rocket exhausts and 
kinetic energy from projectile weapons. The effects of electromagnetic energy 
may be overt, such as damage to another system through sheer magnitude of 
energy, or subtle, such as the corruption of data signals through increased noise. 
                                            
35 Note: Close is a relative term that depends upon the nature of the systems involved. 
“Close” when dealing with the ignition of a rocket engine is significantly shorter than “close” when 
dealing with HF transmissions. 
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Figure 9. Proximity Hazard Example 
 
A proximity hazard occurred in 1967 off the coast of Vietnam as a 
U.S. Navy jet was landing on the U.S.S. Forrestal. The radar systems on the 
Forrestal caused a short and the uncommanded release of a weapon from the 
landing aircraft. The weapon struck a fully armed and fueled aircraft sitting on the 
deck. In the resultant explosion, 134 sailors died and the carrier was severely 
damaged.36 Aircraft and the weapons they carry are now designed to be less 
susceptible to electromagnetic radiation. The Forrestal accident occurred 
because the landing aircraft was within close proximity to the carrier and the 
carrier was propagating energy that had the potential to cause adverse effects in 
other systems. 
d. Resource Hazards 
Definition: A resource hazard is a hazard that results from 
insufficient shared resources or resource conflicts. 
Systems within a system of systems share resources. When 
systems, subsystems or components are integrated, unless it is through an 
                                            
36 National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (1995). Electronic Systems Failures and 
Anomalies Attributed to Electromagnetic Interference (NASA-RP-1374). NASA Marshall Space 
Flight Center. 
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outdated point to point wiring, then it is through shared resources. If the systems 
are dependent upon the resource, or dependent upon the integration that the 
resource provides, then mishaps may result from a compromise of that resource. 
Examples of resources that may be shared are bandwidth, airspace, network 
addresses or memory. There are two types of resource hazards, insufficient 
resources or resource conflicts. These types of resource hazards are shown in 
Figure 10. On the left is an example of insufficient resources. Both System A and 
System B have a requirement for a certain amounts of Resource A. The sum of 
the systems’ resource requirements is greater than the amount of resource 
available. If either System A or System B is dependent upon access to the 
resource, then the performance of that system may be degraded or hazardous. 
On the right is an example of a resource conflict. System C and System D have a 
requirement for a certain part of Resource B. In this instance, Resource B exists 
in sufficient amounts to cover the magnitude of the systems’ resource 
requirements. However, System C and System D have requested access to the 
same section of Resource B. Again, if either system is dependent upon access to 
Resource B, a hazardous situation may occur. 
 
 
Figure 10. Resource Hazard Examples 
 
Within the system of systems context, the most likely resource 
hazard to result from insufficient resources is a hazard that results from 
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insufficient bandwidth. The distributed nature of a system of systems means that 
communications must travel through the atmosphere, which places a limit on the 
bandwidth available (as opposed to cable based communications, where 
bandwidth can be increased by adding cables, atmospheric bandwidth is fixed). 
An example of this type of hazard may occur when a large number of Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are operating in the same area. If the bandwidth is 
insufficient to support the number of UAVs, one or more of the UAVs may lose 
communications and become uncontrollable, resulting in a potentially hazardous 
situation. 
Resource conflicts are particularly applicable to the Air Traffic 
Control systems of systems that have been envisioned, but not implemented. 
These systems of systems automatically allocate airspace to inbound aircraft, 
and some may actually take control of the aircraft. The Air Traffic Control process 
is effectively the allocation of a limited resource (airspace) to systems (aircraft). A 
hazardous situation occurs if two or more aircraft are allocated the same 
airspace. Another example may occur when two previously separate systems of 
systems networks merge or overlap. The new network is an amalgamation of the 
previous two, and resource conflicts may occur if two systems have been 
allocated identical network addresses. 
4. Reconfiguration Hazards 
Definition: A reconfiguration hazard is a hazard that results from the 
transfer of a system of systems from one state to another. 
One aspect of systems of systems which makes them so capable is their 
ability to dynamically reconfigure as operational needs demand. A system of 
systems evolves and morphs in both short and long time frames. In the long time 
frame, new systems are developed and added, old systems are retired. In the 
short time frame, systems are added or removed from the operating network 
dynamically depending upon the demands of the task at hand. For example, in 
times of an elevated threat of ballistic missile launch, the Ballistic Missile Defense 
System may incorporate more Aegis destroyers and space assets than at normal 
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threat levels. While this ability brings with it more capability, it also creates a 
unique type of hazard, the reconfiguration hazard. 
Reconfiguration hazards result from changes in state of a system of 
systems, from one set of systems to a different set of systems, in particular, 
when the system of systems includes a command and control system. If the 
command and control system relies upon knowledge of system states, then 
hazards can result in the transition from one system of systems configuration to 
another if the state knowledge is lost or unknown for new systems. 
Figure 11 graphically demonstrates the concept of reconfiguration 
hazards. In this example, the system of systems reconfigures from SoS1, which 
consists of System A and System B, to SoS2, which consists of System A and 
System C. Each system of systems configuration has its own hazard space when 
in steady state operation. However, the transfer between states introduces new 
hazards that do not belong to either system of systems hazard space. These 
reconfiguration hazards belong to the transition process and exist only during 
and slightly after the transition. 
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Figure 11. Reconfiguration Hazard Example 
 
Reconfiguration hazards may be the most complicated of the systems of 
systems hazards, though tangible examples do exist. Prime candidates for 
reconfiguration hazards are systems that have several states, some of which are 
hazardous and some of which are not. Within the Ballistic Missile Defense 
System, there are several systems that have safe and hazardous states. A 
possible reconfiguration hazard exists between the Command and Control 
centers and the Ground-based Midcourse Interceptors. The Ground-based 
Midcourse Interceptors have the ability to kill threat ballistic missiles in the 
midcourse phase of flight, which means that interceptors based in a confined 
geographical location have the ability to kill ballistic missiles in orbit that may be 
targeted at almost any place on earth. As such, it is possible that the interceptors 
may come under the control of more than one Command and Control center. A 
hazard may occur when the Command and Control center that currently 
commands the interceptor places the missile in a maintenance or diagnostic 
state and subsequently, a second Command and Control center detects a threat 
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missile and takes control of the interceptor. Without proper knowledge of the 
state of the missile, the second Command and Control center, which now has 
control of the missile, may attempt to launch it from an unsafe state. This hazard 
results from the reconfiguration of the Ballistic Missile Defense System, and is 
caused by the loss of state knowledge through the transition. 
5. Interoperability Hazards 
Definition: An interoperability hazard is a hazard that occurs when the 
command, response or data of one system is interpreted by a second system in 
a manner that is inconsistent with the intent of the first system. 
Interoperability mishaps happen with alarming frequency, in particular 
when armed forces of different nations are operating in a combined environment. 
The mishaps generally occur when the intent of one party is not clearly 
communicated to the other. Neither party is solely at fault. The party that gave 
the command may have done so in accordance with their rules, as may have the 
party who responds to the command, and yet a mishap still occurs.  
Interoperability hazards occur in much the same way. Neither system 
necessarily fails, but a mishap occurs when the command, data or response of 
one system is interpreted by a second system in a manner that is inconsistent 
with the intent of the first system. This is shown in Figure 12. System BV1 and 
System BV2 are different versions of the same system. The difference may be 
due to operation by a different nation, or a system upgrade that has been applied 
to one system and not the other. System A transmits Message A to both System 
BV1 and BV2 expecting the same response. However, differences in System BV1 
and BV2 cause the systems to interpret the message differently, but not because 




Figure 12. Interoperability Hazard Example 
 
Interoperability hazards can result from incorrect assumptions about how 
another system operates, for example, an assumption about the coordinate 
system that is used by another system. Some systems employ a coordinate 
system with 0 degrees corresponding to true north, others use magnetic north 
and still others use 0 degrees to represent due east. An incorrect assumption 
about which coordinate system another system uses may result in a 
miscommunication of intent, and a potential hazard if the coordinates correspond 
to an intended target for a missile, or to the airspace assigned to an aircraft 
under Air Traffic Control. 
D. CONCLUSION 
There are many types of systems of systems hazards. The purpose 
behind defining the different types of systems of systems hazards is to gain a 
greater understanding of these hazards in order to better devise technique for 
detecting them. 
A system of systems hazard is any hazard that may occur within a system 
of systems. Systems of systems hazards can be broken down into two main 
types: single system hazards and emergent hazards. A single system hazard is 
any system of systems hazard that is attributable to a single system. An 
emergent hazard is any system of systems hazard that cannot be attributed to a 
single system. 
Within emergent hazards, there are three main categories, integration 
hazards, reconfiguration hazards and interoperability hazards. Reconfiguration 
hazards result from the transition of a system of systems from one state to 
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another. Interoperability hazards occur when the interpretation of a message by 
the receiving system is different from the intent of the transmitting system. 
Integration hazards further divide into interface hazards, proximity hazards and 
resource hazards. An interface hazard occurs when a failure in one system is 
transferred to another system resulting in a mishap. A proximity hazard occurs 
when one system is able to adversely affect another system outside of a defined 
interface. Resource hazards occur when there are insufficient shared resources 
or when there is a resource conflict. 
Now that the types and nature of systems of systems hazards have been 
defined, techniques can be developed to identify and analyze them within real 
systems of systems. In the next chapter, a technique will be developed that deals 
with interface hazards. This technique will then be applied to the Ballistic Missile 
Defense System as a case study to validate the effectiveness of the technique. 
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IV. INTERFACE HAZARD ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Given the complexity of the emergent hazards defined in the previous 
chapter, it is likely that they will each require a purpose-built assessment 
technique. In this chapter, a technique will be developed to assess interface 
hazards within a system of systems. The technique must be cost effective and 
capable of dealing with significant system of systems evolution. In addition, a 
technique is described to assess the residual mishap risk from interface hazards. 
B. SCOPE 
The hazard analysis technique to be developed in this chapter aims to 
identify and assess interface hazards. It is not intended to identify or assess any 
other type of system of systems hazards. 
Specifically, the technique to be developed in this chapter will achieve the 
following for interface hazards: 
(i) Identification of hazards, 
(ii) Assessment of mishap risk, 
(iii) Assessment of residual mishap risk, and 
(iv) Tracking of hazards through system of systems evolution. 
C. INTERFACE HAZARD ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE OVERVIEW 
The interface hazard analysis technique is shown in Figure 13. This 
technique is designed to complete the system safety program tasks that other 
techniques are unable to complete for systems of systems, that is, hazard 
identification and assessment, assessment of residual mishap risk and hazard 
tracking. The details of the technique are given in Appendix A; what follows is a 
narrative and description that explains each step. 
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Figure 13. Interface Hazard Analysis Technique Overview 
 
The interface hazard analysis technique steps are as follows, and detailed 
below: 
(i) Establish System List. List all systems that may be part of the 
system of systems. 
(ii) Define System of Systems Architecture. Determine the types of 
connections each system may have with other systems. 
(iii) Define Guidewords and Network Terminology. Define a list of 
guidewords that will be used to determine system input and output 
failures and a list of message types, paths and message names. 
(iv) Develop System Models. For each system, develop a model that 
lists all mishaps, output failures and connections between inputs 
and mishaps or outputs. 
(v) Analyze Network. Search the network for connections between 
systems that can result in mishaps. 
(vi) Assess Mishap Risk. For each identified hazard, determine the 
mishap risk in terms of consequence and probability. 
(vii) Assess Residual Mishap Risk. Determine the total risk remaining 
in the system for all interface hazards. 
D. SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE 
Systems of systems exhibit complicated run-time networks. There are a 
large number of factors that can affect the shape of the network: mission, role, 
weather, geography and so on. In order to perform an efficient and useful 
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analysis, the system of systems network must be simplified. The interface hazard 
analysis technique will deal with possible links between systems, rather than the 
actual run time links. For the purposes of this analysis, the set of possible links 
defines the system architecture. An example of a system of systems run-time 
network is shown in Figure 14. This is how the system of systems may look at 
run time. The systems are geographically distributed and while some systems 
are able to connect to other systems, geography, weather or operational 
necessity may prevent them from doing so. In order to perform the analysis, the 
possible connections must be determined. A hazard analysis deals with events 
that are possible, though they may not be probable. As such, if it is possible for a 
connection to occur, it should be included in the architecture. 
 
 
Figure 14. Example System of Systems Network 
 
Figure 15 shows how the system of systems network shown in Figure 14 
can be represented as a set of possible connections. There is only one of each 
system type in the diagram, and rather than deal with which systems actually 
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connect to each other, it describes how each system may connect to other 
systems. As such, there is only one link between each pair of systems. In 






Figure 15: Example System of Systems Architecture Diagram 
 
The diagram shown in Figure 15 may be readable for a system of systems 
that only includes five system types, but for a larger system of systems, it may 
become unwieldy, unreadable and unusable. A much simpler, and more usable, 
representation is shown in Table 4. This table is a summary of the diagram 
shown in Figure 15. It simply and quickly answers the question “How does 
System 1 interact with System 2?” This is the pertinent question for interface 
hazard analyses, which will become more apparent as the technique is further 
developed. 
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 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
S1 m:n 1:n m:n 1:1 m:n 
S2 n:1 - 1:1 n:1 1:1 
S3 m:n 1:1 - 1:1 1:1 
S4 1:1 1:n 1:1 - 1:n 
S5 m:n 1:1 1:1 n:1 - 
Table 4. Example System of Systems Architecture Table 
 
E. SYSTEM MODELS 
1. Overview 
The system architecture describes how the systems may connect, or 
communicate, with each other. In order to determine the interface hazards 
present within a system of systems, the individual system behaviors must be 
modeled in a manner that is both accurate and cost effective. Systems that 
operate within a system of systems are complex entities. For a system such as 
Aegis, an accurate model of the full system may never be developed even for 
training purposes, let alone for a system safety program. System models are 
expensive and are unlikely to be fully and accurately developed just for a system 
safety program. A simple model must be developed that meets the needs of an 
interface hazard analysis while remaining cost effective. 
The simplest system model is the Input/Output (I/O) Model shown in 
Figure 16. This model describes a system as a ‘black box’. That is, it is only 
concerned with the inputs and outputs of the system, and how they relate. It does 
not describe how the system transforms the inputs into outputs. 
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Figure 16. System Input/Output (I/O) Model 
The System I/O Model is inadequate for performing an interface hazard 
analysis. Firstly, an interface hazard analysis requires knowledge of more than 
just system inputs and outputs. A third concern is mishaps, which may or may 
not form part of the output set. This third concern modifies the System I/O Model 
into that shown in Figure 17, the System Input/Output/Mishap (IOM) Model. This 
model describes a system in terms of the inputs whose failure can cause 
mishaps or output failures, the outputs that can fail, the mishaps, and the 
relationships between them. 
 
Figure 17. System Input/Output/Mishap (IOM) Model 
 
For the purposes of an interface hazard analysis, a System IOM Model 
consists of: 
(i) A list of all system mishaps, 
(ii) A list of system input failures and how they link to mishaps or 
output failures, and 
(iii) A list of system output failures. 
The generation of each of these lists is described below. 
2. Guide Words and Network Terminology 
To ensure that each of the lists that form the system model are consistent 
and compatible, a standardized set of terms must be used. The system model 
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deals primarily with possible failures, and hence there must be a consistent list of 
failure modes for the inputs and outputs of the system. These are the guide 
words that will be used to identify potential failures. The list of guide words will be 
application specific, but may be very similar to the guide words used for internal 
system interface and software Hazard and Operability studies that are shown in 
Table 3. 
In addition, it is necessary to consistently determine the names of the 
system inputs and outputs. A system input or output consists of a transmission 
path, a message type and a message name. The transmission path may be a 
wireless data network, a direct cable connection, a computer network or simple 
voice communications. The message type will be one of command, data or 
response. The message name can take on a large number of values. It is 
important, when comparing inputs with outputs, that consistent terminology be 
used. For example, an interface hazard may be overlooked if the message name 
“Target Location” is used for one system and “Location of Target” is used for 
another. 
3. Mishap Identification 
Once a consistent terminology has been defined, the first step in creating 
a system model is to identify the mishaps associated with each system. The 
mishap list for each system should be simple to determine within a system of 
systems, or interface hazard analysis, as the mishaps should have been 
identified as part of the system hazard analysis. The mishap list for a system 
does not change when it is integrated into a system of systems. 
4. Input Analysis 
Performing an input analysis is the most significant part of developing a 
system model. An input analysis is an application of the HAZOP process to the 
inputs of a system in isolation. It seeks to answer the question: “What is the 
effect of a given input failure on the mishaps and outputs of a system?” 
The analysis starts with a list of system inputs, defined in terms of 
transmission path, message type and message name, and a list of guide words 
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that describe how an input may fail. Each guide word is applied to each input in 
turn, and the effects of that failure on mishaps and outputs assessed. The result 
is a list of links, from inputs to outputs or inputs to mishaps. It is of no concern at 
this point whether any other system could actually cause the input failure. Each 
system must undergo the input analysis process in isolation. 
A link can be created between an input and a mishap, as in Figure 18, or 
multiple inputs and a mishap, as in Figure 19. While there may be many inputs 
within a link, there should only ever be one mishap. If a set of inputs cause more 
than one mishap, then a second link, with the same inputs but the alternate 
mishap, should be created. 
 
 
Figure 18. Input to Mishap Link 
 
Figure 19. Multiple Inputs to Mishap Link 
 
In addition to causing mishaps, failed inputs can also cause failed outputs. 
A single failed input may cause a single failed output, as in Figure 20, or it may 
take more than one failed input to cause a failed output, as in Figure 21. 
Alternatively, a single failed input may cause numerous failed outputs, as in 
Figure 22. A link must have a single failed input, or a single failed output, or both. 
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If the link involves multiple inputs and multiple outputs, then it can be separated 
into two or more links that meet the single input or single output requirement. 
 
 




Figure 21. Multiple Inputs to Single Output Link 
 
Figure 22. Single Input to Multiple Outputs Link 
 
An input analysis generates a list of dependent events, that is, none of the 
links that are identified are initiators. They all depend upon other events 
transpiring. The events that may trigger one of the links from inputs to outputs, or 
from inputs to mishaps, will be generated in the output analysis. 
 54
5. Output Analysis 
An output analysis is a HAZOP analysis of the outputs of a system to 
determine which system outputs can fail as a result of a system failure, and how 
those outputs fail. It uses the same guidewords as the input analysis, and applies 
them to each of the system outputs in order to determine whether that type of 
failure is possible. A list of system failures that can cause the output failure can 
be used to calculate the probability of the output failing, or in developing 
mitigation strategies to reduce that probability. 
System output failures may occur singly, as in Figure 23, or in groups, as 
in Figure 24. System outputs should only be grouped if they are inseparable, that 
is, the set of conditions or system failures which causes one output failure 
causes every output failure in the group. If it is possible for a subset of the output 
failures to occur from the conditions and system failures, then a second group of 
system output failures should be created. 
 
 
Figure 23. Failure to Output Link 
 




F. NETWORK ANALYSIS 
The input analysis and output analysis generates the building blocks for 
defining interface hazards. It is clear from the description of the links above that a 
link can be drawn from an initiating failure to a mishap. The purpose of a network 
analysis is to assemble the links into interface hazards and to ensure that all 
possible combinations are assessed. Figure 25 shows how the results of an input 
and output analysis can be assembled to form an interface hazard. 
 
 
Figure 25. Example Interface Hazard Assembled from System Models 
 
The network analysis technique to be used to identify interface hazards is 
similar to a Fault Tree Analysis. The analysis starts with an end event, a link from 
an input to a mishap, and works backwards, adding links from inputs to outputs 
and failures to outputs. The result is a tree that describes all the ways in which an 
interface hazard can cause a mishap. 
The basic building blocks of a network analysis are shown in Table 5. 
These symbols are used instead of the IOM Model as there can be a large 




Table 5. Network Analysis Symbology 
 
An example of how these symbols may be used to define an interface 
hazard out of the basic elements is shown in Figure 26, which is the symbolic 
representation of the interface hazard shown in Figure 25. This is a very simple 
example that shows only one way for the mishap to occur. In reality, there may 
be many ways for a link to be created between initiating failures and the two 
inputs that are required to fail for the mishap to occur. Figure 27 is an example of 
how a network analysis tree is more likely to look. Each dashed box represents 
the different links which may continue the tree at that point. In this example, there 
are ten ways that the mishap can occur. Note that the interface hazard described 
by Figure 25 and Figure 26 is also in Figure 27, shown by the option in red. 
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Figure 26. Example Network Analysis 
 
Figure 27. Example Network Analysis Showing Options at Each Stage 
 
There are other ways to identify interface hazards within the network. A 
brute force method may be used that cycles through every possible combination 
of systems. However, the top down, tree approach is more efficient and, like the 
brute force approach, is simple to automate. The ability to automate the network 
search will become apparent when dealing with very large scale systems of 
systems that continuously evolve. In this circumstance, it would be inefficient to 




G. ASSESSMENT OF MISHAP RISK 
1. Overview 
The set of system of systems hazards includes hazards that are identified 
by the interface hazard analysis technique and hazards that are identified by 
system hazard analysis techniques. The end result is a list of hazards that must 
exist in a common database and must be comparable. Hazards that have been 
identified by a system hazard analysis technique undergo a mishap risk 
assessment, resulting in a statement of the consequence and probability of the 
hazard in question. Hazards identified by the interface hazard analysis technique 
must have a similar assessment. 
2. Consequence 
The consequence of an interface hazard is the consequence of the 
mishap at the top of the network analysis tree. Systems of systems mishaps are 
likely to have been identified during the system hazard analysis process for each 
individual system and hence the assessment of consequence is also likely to be 
already complete. 
3. Probability 
The probability of a interface hazard occurring is a function of the 
component elements, that is, the links between inputs and outputs, the links 
between inputs and mishaps, and the links between failures and outputs. Each 
identified link must be assigned a probability of occurrence. For links between 
failures and outputs, this probability is the probability that the failure will occur 
and that that failure will translate to an output failure. For links between inputs 
and outputs, the probability is the probability that the input failure will be 
retransmitted as an output failure. For links between inputs and mishaps, the 
probability is the probability that the mishap will occur given that the input failures 
have occurred. Each of these probabilities should be assessed qualitatively in 
accordance with MIL-STD-882D or a similar safety standard.  
Once each link in the interface hazard has been identified, and each link 
has been assigned a qualitatively probability, the probability of the interface 
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hazard can be determined by combining all probabilities involved. The 
combination of qualitative probabilities is discussed fully in Appendix B, however 
the basic principle is to assign a qualitative result to the logical conjunction (i.e., 
the AND function) of two qualitative probabilities, producing a table like that of 
Table 6. A two dimensional table is sufficient for all qualitative probability 
combinations as the AND function is associative.37 
 
AND Frequent Probable Occasional Remote Improbable
Frequent Frequent Probable Occasional Remote Improbable
Probable Probable Occasional Remote Remote Improbable
Occasional Occasional Remote Remote Improbable Improbable
Remote Remote Remote Improbable Improbable Improbable
Improbable Improbable Improbable Improbable Improbable Improbable
Table 6. Example Qualitative Probability Combinations 
 
Consider the example from Figure 26. Suppose the events in Figure 26 
are assessed as having the probabilities shown in Table 7. As each event is 
required for the interface hazard to occur, the hazard probability is (using the 
qualitative probability combination scheme from Table 6): 
 
As such, the probability of the interface hazard shown in Figure 26 is 
Improbable. 
                                            
37 That is, ( ) ( )a b c a b c a b c× × = × × = × × , or ( ) ( )a b c a b c a b c∧ ∧ = ∧ ∧ = ∧ ∧ . 
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Element Probability
Failure to Multiple Outputs Remote 
Multiple Inputs to Single Output Frequent 
Failure to Output Occasional 
Multiple Inputs to Mishap Frequent 
Table 7. Example Event Probabilities for the Interface Hazard from 
Figure 26. 
 
H. RESIDUAL MISHAP RISK 
The residual mishap risk is a significant system of systems factor. It is the 
risk that is assumed by the certifying authority and the operators. A system of 
systems should never be operated without knowing what the residual mishap risk 
is. 
A system hazard analysis may have complete system coverage, and as 
such, the residual mishap risk can be calculated from the identified risks. A 
system of systems hazard analysis is unlikely to have complete coverage. A 
hazard analysis for a system of systems, including the interface hazard analysis 
technique presented here, is more likely to use a targeted search method that 
has a high probability of finding the significant hazards. As such, there will be 
unknowns at the completion of the analysis, resulting in some degree of 
uncertainty about the actual amount of residual mishap risk. 
When dealing with incomplete information, there are three subcategories. 
You either have the information (known), you are aware that you do not have 
some information (known unknowns), or you are unaware that you do not have 
some information (unknown unknowns). In calculating the residual mishap risk 
for a system of systems, each of these types of information must be taken into 
account. The information that you have should be analyzed. The information that 




acceptable or unacceptable to remain unknown. In the latter case, effort should 
be made to gain the information. Information that you do not have and do not 
know that you do not have should be minimized through the use of a high-quality, 
well-funded exploratory process conducted by the appropriate personnel. 
Within an interface hazard assessment, the known information is the list of 
identified hazards. These hazards can be analyzed to generate an overall risk 
assessment for the system of systems in terms of interface hazards. However, 
there are two other factors that affect the residual mishap risk. The first is the 
interface hazards that are present in the system of systems and are part of the 
system models but have not been identified by the network analysis. The second 
is the interface hazards that exist in the system of systems that are not identified 
because the system models do not accurately represent the systems. The first is 
a type of known unknown, the second a type of unknown. 
Steps can be taken to minimize the impact of interface hazards that are 
part of the system models but not identified by the network analysis. A network 
analysis starts with a top-level event, a link from an input to a mishap, and works 
backwards to determine the events that can cause that mishap. As each new 
event is added to the tree, the probability that the hazard will occur decreases. 
As such, at a given level of decomposition, an assessment can be made about 
all interface hazards that occur beyond that level of decomposition. This 
assessment will depend upon the qualitative probability combination scheme that 
is chosen by the analyst. 
Consider a qualitative probability combination table that has the result of 
the combination of two frequent events as less than frequent (e.g., Table 21 or 
Table 22). The worst-case scenario for an interface hazard with five elements is 
a direct chain of events, like that shown in Figure 28. The probability of this 
hazard is improbable. If you add another event to the left of this chain, the 
probability is still improbable. In fact regardless of how many events you add to 
the left of this chain, the probability will always be improbable. In addition, if you 
 62
add parallel events, say by changing the second order event from a single input 
single output to a multiple input single output and then add a failure to output in 
parallel with the third-order event, then the probability is still improbable. If the 
chain stops at the fourth-order event, then the probability is remote. In this case, 
addition of extra events, either at the left of the chain or in parallel early in the 
chain, will decrease the probability. 
Thus we can make the following conclusion. For qualitative probability 
combination schemes where the combination of two frequent probabilities is less 
than frequent, the network analysis tree need only extend to fifth-order events. If 
the network analysis tree completely covers all fifth-order or less events, then the 
probability of all remaining interface hazards is improbable. 
 
 
Figure 28. Worst Case Probability Chain for Fifth Order Interface Hazards 
 
If the combination scheme dictates that the combination of two frequent 
events is still frequent (Table 23 or Table 24), then creating a network tree that 
decomposes to the fifth level does not guarantee that all other hazards have a 
probability of improbable. Consider Figure 28, if the combination of Frequent 
AND Frequent is Frequent, then the probability of the interface hazard in Figure 
28 is Frequent. In fact, the chain could extend forever and the probability would 
still be Frequent. This is a mathematical anomaly within the qualitative probability 
combination calculations, which allows a frequent event to have a probability of 
1, a mathematical possibility but practical improbability. In any event, the chain 
can only continue to have a frequent probability if there are sufficient frequent 
events within the system of systems. In this instance, the network analysis tree 
must be defined four steps past the number of frequent events. For example, if 
there are only three frequent events within the system of systems, then all 
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interface hazards that extend past the seventh order will have probabilities of 
improbable. That is, in the worst-case scenario, the three frequent events will 
combine to form a chain whose probability is still frequent. Four more events will 
ensure that this probability is reduced to improbable. 
The above assumptions, regarding interface hazards beyond a certain 
order, refer only to the interface hazards that remain unidentified due to the 
network analysis. There are other interface hazards that may remain unidentified 
because of shortfalls in the system models. Regardless of how deep or thorough 
the network analysis is, these interface hazards will never be identified. These 
are the unknown unknowns, and they must be minimized. In order to minimize 
the likelihood of overlooking interface hazards in this manner, the development of 
the system models must be thorough. This involves a combination of ensuring 
that the engineers who perform the analyses are experienced and 
knowledgeable, the list of guide words is appropriate for the application and all 
aspects of the system inputs and outputs are considered. 
In summary, the residual mishap risk of a system of systems due to 
interface hazards is the culmination of the identified risks, the knowledge that all 
risks not identified by the network analysis but present in the system models 
have a maximum probability and the risks that result from unknown system data. 
I. SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS EVOLUTION 
Systems of systems evolve over the life cycle. New systems are added, 
old ones removed and current systems are modified. In order to remain relevant 
and cost effective, a hazard analysis technique must be able to cope with 
changes to the system of systems. 
The interface hazard analysis technique presented above is able to 
address system changes. The system models that are developed during the 
input and output analyses are independent of other systems. That is, an input 
failure is linked to a mishap regardless of whether there is another system that 
can cause the input failure to occur. An output failure is defined regardless of  
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whether there is another system that is susceptible to that failure. In addition, the 
process that searches for interface hazards, the network analysis, is automated 
and hence requires little effort to rerun. 
Thus the interface hazard analysis technique remains relevant throughout 
the systems of systems life cycle. In the event of a change to a system or an 
addition or removal of a system, only the relevant system model need be altered, 
removed or added. All other system models remain the same. 
J. CONCLUSION 
The interface hazard analysis technique has been developed to identify 
and assess interface hazards, assess the residual mishap risk of interface 
hazards and to track hazards through systems of systems evolution. This 
technique will fulfill the shortfalls in the system safety program when applied to 
systems of systems. 
The technique has several advantages. Firstly, it does not require complex 
system models to be developed. A HAZOP analysis of the inputs and outputs of 
a system will produce a sufficient system model. The system models can then be 
analyzed within a network to produce the interface hazards. The network 
analysis is a simple process that can be automated. 
Interface hazards are assessed in the same manner as system hazards, 
that is, they are assessed in terms of probability and consequence. The 
consequence assessment is the same as for system hazards. The probability 
assessment involves the combination of the qualitative probabilities of the 
component events. 
The residual mishap risk associated with interface hazards is a function of 
the identified hazards, the hazards not identified by the network analysis (whose 
probability is limited) and the hazards not identified due to shortfalls in the system 
models. The first two can be qualitatively assessed. The last can be minimized 
through an expert application of the interface hazard analysis technique. 
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The interface hazard analysis technique can keep track of interface 
hazards throughout the system life cycle, even in the face of significant systems 
of systems evolution. The main reason for this is that the system models are 
independent of each other. They are developed in isolation from the system of 
systems and do not require alteration when new systems are added. In addition, 
the network analysis technique is simple to automate, which simplifies repetition 
of the analysis. 
The interface hazard analysis technique is defined in Appendix A. Now 
that the technique has been described, it will be applied to a case study in the 
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V. APPLICATION OF TECHNIQUE TO CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A case study is required to ensure that the interface hazard analysis 
technique is able to detect interface hazards. The Ballistic Missile Defense 
System will be used to validate the effectiveness of this technique. 
In this chapter, the development of a software application that employs the 
interface hazard analysis technique will be described. This software application 
was developed to prove not only the capabilities of the interface hazard analysis 
technique, but also to prove that a software application that employs the 
technique was conceptually feasible. 
The software application will then be applied to the Ballistic Missile 
Defense System and interface hazards generated. An overview of the Ballistic 
Missile Defense System is provided in Appendix C. Representative data will be 
used to generate system models for the Ballistic Missile Defense System and the 
case study will be kept sufficiently small to conform to the time constraints of 
postgraduate research. The intent is that the case study will further confirm the 
feasibility of the interface hazard analysis technique and the corresponding 
software.  
B. SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 
1. Overview 
In order to validate that the interface hazard analysis technique was 
practical and capable of producing results, a software application was developed. 
The application was built as a concept demonstrator. It allows the user to enter 
system models and then performs a network analysis. While it performs the 
function of an interface hazard analysis, it is not intended to be used in practice. 
It does not include the usual level of error checking and user functions that would 
be expected of an application of this type. It’s purpose is to demonstrate that the 
interface hazard analysis technique described above is feasible. 
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2. Functional Requirements 
The software application was designed in order to meet the following basic 
requirements: 
(i) the application shall allow the user to enter the system model data, 
(ii) the application shall perform a network analysis on the system 
model data, 
(iii) the application shall display the interface hazards found during the 
network analysis to the user, and 
(iv) the application shall allow changes to the system model data to 
simulate the evolution of a system of systems. 
3. Design 
The application was developed in Java and employs a GUI to allow the 
user to enter the system model data and to display the identified interface 
hazards. The core of the application is the object orientated modeling of a system 
of systems and the functions that perform the network analysis. The object 




















The model of the system of systems follows the real world structure. The 
highest level object is a data object that contains a number of application settings 
and the main system of systems object. Within the system of systems object 
there is an array of systems and a network object. The purpose of the network 
object is to track the types of connections that exist between systems. Each 
system object represents a system that may be present in the system of 
systems. 
The system object is an implementation of the IOM model. It consists of 
mishaps, inputs, outputs, links from inputs to outputs and links from inputs to 
mishaps. These are the pieces that will later be constructed into network analysis 
trees. The inputs, outputs and mishaps are objects that represent the real world 
nature of the systems. The links are simulations of the real world systems 
performance. They contain the pointers38 to inputs, outputs and mishaps 
necessary to describe the links as well as a value that represents the probability 
that the link will occur. Outputs come in two forms; they may either be used later 
in a system link or as an initiating event. 
A separate hazard generating object is used to perform the network 
analysis. It creates hazard objects that contain pointers to the links and outputs 
that describe the hazard. A hazard object is able to calculate the hazard 
probability, consequence and priority based on its component events. Due to 
time constraints, the hazard generating object that was used in the concept 
demonstrator employed a brute force algorithm that searched a number of basic 
interface hazard schemes. It did not employ a more intelligent and efficient, tree 
structured search algorithm. Such an algorithm is not a particularly complex task, 
and its generation was not considered necessary to demonstrate the concept. 
 
 
                                            
38 In Java, this is of little consequence as all object references are pointers. However, this 
may make a difference if the application is implemented in another language. 
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The GUI used a relatively simple set of text boxes, drop down boxes and 
check boxes in order to collect the system model data. The data is stored within 
its own object and may be written to an XML file for later restoration. An example 
of the application GUI is shown in Figure 30. This example is typical of the 
application and is used to collect the input to output links for each system model. 
 
 
Figure 30. Interface Hazard Analysis Application Screen Shot – GUI 
 
The application also includes interfaces to collect the following data: 
(i) Analysis settings such as the qualitative probability levels, the 
consequence levels, the calculation of priority from probability and 
consequence, and the combination of two qualitative probabilities. 
(ii) A complete list of systems within the system of systems. 
(iii) A system architecture table. 
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(iv) A list of mishaps for each system. 
(v) System Input/Output settings such as the transmission paths, the 
message types, the message names and the guide words or error 
types. All are customizable. 
(vi) A list of inputs for each system. 
(vii) A list of outputs for each system, including those that can initiate an 
interface hazard. 
(viii) A list of links from inputs to outputs for each system. 
(viii)  A list of links from inputs to mishaps for each system. 
In addition, the application displays the results of the network analysis to 
the user through both text and graphics. A screen shot of the hazard display is 




Figure 31. Interface Hazard Analysis Application Screen Shot – Hazard 
Display 
 
Overall, the interface hazard analysis application is not a particularly 
complex application. The majority of the application deals with data entry and 
storage. The application was developed over a period of two months and 
consists of approximately 5,500 lines of code. Although its operation was 
successfully verified with test data, the application will also be tested on the 
Ballistic Missile Defense System case study. 
C. SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS HAZARD ANALYSIS 
1. Overview 
The Ballistic Missile Defense System employs systems of systems 
technology to achieve a complex mission within a hazardous environment and as 
 74
such, is ideal for validating the interface hazard analysis technique. The data that 
will be used to perform this validation has been generated from the functional 
roles of the systems that comprise the system of systems and may or may not be 
representative of actual system performance. In addition, the system data has 
been simplified to reduce the time taken to perform the analysis to a manageable 
level. Neither of these facts affects the validity of the case study. 
2. System of Systems Architecture 
The systems that comprise the system of systems are shown in Table 8. 
 
Symbol System Role 
S1 Aegis Destroyer Sensor and Weapon System
S2 Airborne Laser Sensor and Weapon System
S3 Command and Control Center CandC 
S4 Forward-based X-Band Radar Sensor 
S5 Ground-based Midcourse Interceptors Weapon 
S6 Kinetic Energy Interceptors Weapon 
S7 Multiple Kill Vehicles Weapon 
S8 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Weapon 
S9 Sea-based X-Band Radar Sensor 
S10 Space-based Sensors Sensor 
S11 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Weapon 
Table 8. Ballistic Missile Defense System Component Systems 
 
These systems interact as shown in Table 9. 
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 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 
S1 m:n n:1 m:n m:n m:n m:n m:n m:n n:1 - m:n 
S2 1:n - 1:n 1:n - - - - 1:1 - - 
S3 m:n n:1 m:n m:n m:n m:n m:n m:n n:1 m:n m:n 
S4 m:n n:1 m:n m:n m:n m:n m:n m:n n:1 - m:n 
S5 m:n - m:n m:n - - - - n:1 - - 
S6 m:n - m:n m:n - - - - n:1 - - 
S7 m:n - m:n m:n - - - - n:1 - - 
S8 m:n - m:n m:n - - - - n:1 - - 
S9 1:n 1:1 1:n 1:n 1:n 1:n 1:n 1:n - - 1:n 
S10 - - m:n - - - - - - - - 
S11 m:n - m:n m:n - - - - n:1 - - 
Table 9. Ballistic Missile Defense System Architecture Table 
 
3. System Models 
Development of the system models starts with identification of 
transmission paths, message types, message names and analysis guide words. 
The possible transmission paths are shown in Table 10. The message types are 
shown in Table 11 and message names in Table 12. The guide words and their 











Table 11. Ballistic Missile Defense System Message Types 
 
Message Names Message Meaning 
Cue Command a sensor system to  track a target 
Fire Command a weapon system to fire on a target 
System Location The geographic location of the transmitting system 
System Status The status of the transmitting system 
Target Detected Communicate that a target has been detected 
Target Track A data set that describes the ballistic path of a target 
Target Type The type of target that has been detected 
Table 12. Ballistic Missile Defense System Message Names 
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Guide Word Meaning 
None Intended result not achieved. 
More Too much of some parameter. 
Less Not enough of a parameter. 
As Well As Unintended activity or material. 
Part Of Parts of the parameter are missing. 
Reverse Value is opposite of intended value. 
Other Than Something other than intended result happens. 
Omission Intended output missing. 
Commission Unintended output. 
Early Output occurs too soon. 
Late Output occurs too late. 
Coarse Incorrect Output’s value is wrong. 
Subtle Incorrect Output’s value is wrong, but cannot be detected. 
Table 13. Guide Words for Input and Output Analysis 
 
The next step is to define a list of mishaps for all systems. These mishaps 
can be obtained from the system hazard analysis. An example mishap list for the 
Aegis Destroyer is shown in Table 14. The complete list for all systems is shown 
in Appendix D, Table 25. 
 78
System Mishap Consequence
Radiation causes harm to 
personnel 
Critical 
Radiation causes harm to 
property 
Critical 
Missile exhaust causes harm to 
personnel 
Critical 
Missile impacts friendly system Catastrophic 
Missile impacts friendly building Catastrophic 
Missile impacts friendly terrain Marginal 
Aegis Destroyer 
Missile impacts hostile terrain Negligible 
Table 14. Mishap List for the Aegis Destroyer 
 
The inputs and outputs for each system are shown in Appendix D Table 
26 and Table 27, respectively. This data can be collected from system design 
documentation (such as Interface Design Descriptions) and the system of 
systems network specification. For the purposes of an input or output analysis, it 
is necessary to collate this data into a single, usable source so that each input or 
output can be systematically analyzed using the guide words. Note that the 
inputs and outputs are formed from the defined transmission paths, message 
types and message names. 
Once the system inputs and the guide words have been defined, the input 
analysis can be performed. For each system input, apply each guide word and 
determine the effects on system mishaps and outputs. For example, within the 
Forward-based X-Band Radar System, the input “Network Data Cue” and the 
guide word “None” combine to form the input failure “Network Data Cue None”. 
This type of input failure does not cause a system mishap, nor does it cause a 
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system output to fail. However, the same input, when combined with the 
“Commission” guide word may lead to a system mishap if the cueing of the radar 
system causes personnel in front of the antenna to be exposed to radiation. The 
result of this is a link from the input “Network Data Cue Commission” to the 
mishap “Radiation Causes Harm to Personnel”. Within the Command and 
Control System, the input “Network Data Target Track” combined with the guide 
word “Subtle Incorrect” leads to a dependent output failure “Network Data Target 
Track Subtle Incorrect”. This is a link from an input to an output. The full list of 
system input to mishap and input to output links are shown in Appendix D Table 
28 through Table 42. Together, these tables describe the system models for 
each of the systems within the Ballistic Missile Defense System. 
4. Preliminary Hazard List 
The system model data was entered into the interface hazard analysis 
application and a network analysis performed. Note that the application can only 
detect a limited number of a interface hazard schemes due to the abridged 
version of the network analysis algorithm. From the system model data, the 
application detected 364 interface hazards ranging from priority two to priority 
twenty. Some selected hazards are shown in Table 15. From these results, it is 
clear that the interface hazard analysis technique, and the interface hazard 
analysis application, are both capable of detecting interface hazards. The 
application should be developed further in order to be usefully applied to a full 
scale system of systems. 
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Hazard Probability Consequence Priority
Network Data Target Type Subtle 
Incorrect failure in Aegis Destroyer 
causes 
Missile Impacts Friendly System 
mishap in Patriot Advanced 
Capability-3 
Probable Catastrophic 2 
Network Data Target Track Subtle 
Incorrect failure in Forward-based X-
Band Radar 
causes 
Missile Impacts Friendly Building 
mishap in Kinetic Energy Interceptors 
Remote Catastrophic 8 
Network Data Target Type Subtle 
Incorrect failure in Airborne Laser 
causes 
Network Data Target Type Subtle 
Incorrect failure in Command and 
Control Center 
causes 
Missile Impacts Friendly System 
mishap in Aegis Destroyer 
Remote Catastrophic 8 
Network Data Target Detected 
Commission failure in Airborne Laser 
causes 
Network Command Cue Commission 
failure in Command and Control 
Center 
causes 
Radiation Causes Harm to Personnel 
mishap in Sea-based X-Band Radar 
Remote Critical 10 
Table 15. Selected Interface Hazards from the Ballistic Missile Defense 
System Case Study 
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From the analysis, it is clear that the most significant hazard within the 
Ballistic Missile Defense System is the incorrect designation of a target as a 
threat (Network Data Target Type Subtle Incorrect) when it is in fact a friendly 
system. This has occurred on several occasions with the Patriot system that 
confused low flying aircraft with cruise missiles. It is possible that the Ballistic 
Missile Defense System may misidentify aircraft or rockets carrying a non-
threatening payload (particularly from China or Russia) as a threat. Any resultant 
destruction of such a system could be catastrophic. However, it is likely that the 
Missile Defense Agency has already taken this into account, and begun to 
mitigate the hazard. What the interface hazard analysis does reveal is the large 
number of ways in which such a mishap can occur. 
5. System of Systems Evolution 
To demonstrate the ability of the interface hazard analysis technique to 
deal with system of systems evolution, a mythical “Advanced Technology 
System” was added to the system of systems network. The Advanced 
Technology System is a detection system that detects launches of ballistic 
missiles. It does not provide track data accurate enough for a launch, it only 
detects launches and gives the general location. It interfaces only with the 
Command and Control Center and there are a large number of devices. It is a 
passive system, and hence there are only minor mishaps associated with it. 
In adding the Advanced Technology System to the system of systems, 
only its system model was added. None of the other system models were altered 
in anyway. The system model consists of just one failed output: Network Data 
Target Detected Commission with probability: Remote. 
When the network analysis was run again, eighteen extra hazards were 
identified. These hazards involved other systems, demonstrating the interface 
hazard analysis technique successfully identifies new hazards when new 
systems are added without altering current system models. An example hazard is 
shown in Table 16. 
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Hazard Probability Consequence Priority
Network Data Target Detected 
Commission failure in Advanced 
Technology System 
causes 
Network Command Fire Commission 
failure in Command and Control 
Center 
causes 
Missile Exhaust Causes Harm to 
Personnel failure in Ground-based 
Midcourse Interceptor 
Remote Critical 10 
Table 16. Example Hazard following the addition of the Advanced 
Technology System 
 
D. LESSONS LEARNT 
A significant result of this case study is the large number of hazards that 
are identified from a relatively small set of systems, each with a restricted set of 
inputs and outputs. In particular, a large number of hazards are very similar. This 
is due to the types of systems present in the Ballistic Missile Defense System, 
which perform the role of a sensor, a weapon or both. The application should be 
modified to group similar hazards together to ensure that all hazard types receive 
adequate visibility. 
In addition, while the generation of a simple, linear system model is not 
particularly onerous, the system models can become difficult to generate and 
comprehend when dealing with multiple input failures leading to multiple outputs 
or mishaps. For example, if there are ten inputs and ten guide words then there 
are 100 single input/guide words combinations. When considering two inputs, 
there are 9,000 combinations, when considering three, there are 720,000 




Both the interface hazard analysis technique and the interface hazard 
analysis application were successful in detecting Ballistic Missile Defense 
System interface hazards. Although the application employed a limited network 
analysis technique, it was still able to detect a significant number of interface 
hazards. The concept of a software application that can detect interface hazards 
using the interface hazard analysis technique was successfully demonstrated. 
In addition, the interface hazard analysis technique proved both useable 
and effective. The system models that were required were not difficult to 
generate, even from a basic understanding of the Ballistic Missile Defense 
System. The input and output analyses were relatively simple to perform, 
although it may be more difficult to identify links that involve multiple inputs or 
outputs when the number of inputs and outputs are expanded beyond the 
modest set used in this case study. 
In all, both the interface hazard analysis technique and the concept of a 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. KEY FINDINGS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
The existence of systems of systems hazards, and in particular emergent 
hazards, has been acknowledged since the first systems of systems were 
conceived. In this thesis, the types of emergent hazards have been identified and 
defined. Systems of systems hazards can be broken down into two main 
categories. Single system hazards are those that are attributable to a single 
system only and require no system interaction in order to occur, and emergent 
hazards are those that require the interaction of two or more systems. 
Emergent hazards were the focus of this research. System hazard 
analysis techniques are largely unable to identify emergent hazards. New 
techniques must be developed to identify and analyze emergent hazards. Before 
this can be done, the types of emergent hazards must be further defined. There 
are three sub categories of emergent hazards. Reconfiguration hazards are 
unique to systems of systems and do not have a parallel within the system 
space. They are caused by the transition of a system of systems from one state 
to another. Interoperability hazards result from miscommunications. A receiving 
system interprets a message or signal in a manner that conflicts with the intent of 
the transmitting system. The third subcategory is integration hazards. These 
hazards can best be described by the subtypes of the category. There are three 
subtypes, interface hazards, resource hazards and proximity hazards. An 
interface hazard results from a failure or partial performance in one system 
causing a mishap in a second system. A resource hazard occurs when there are 
insufficient levels of shared resources to support the systems present, or when 
there is a conflict over a certain part of the shared resource. A proximity hazard 
occurs when one system causes a mishap in another without using a defined 
interface. 
The purpose of identifying the types of emergent hazards is to focus the 
development of hazard analysis techniques. In this thesis, a process was defined 
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that specifically targets interface hazards. This is a small part of the puzzle. A full 
system of systems hazard analysis must address all hazard types. Other 
techniques must be used in conjunction with the interface hazard analysis 
technique defined in this thesis. 
The interface hazard analysis technique is based upon the 
Input/Output/Mishap (IOM) system model. The IOM model is an extension of the 
more traditional Input/Output (IO) model. An interface hazard consists of not just 
inputs and outputs but mishaps as well. The IOM model for a system is a set of 
links between inputs and outputs, links between inputs and mishaps, and outputs 
that can fail due to a system failure. These three elements can be used to 
construct an interface hazard. They form a path for a system failure, which may 
otherwise be innocuous, to transfer to another system where it may cause a 
mishap. 
The interface hazard analysis technique has two important characteristics. 
Firstly, the system model is relatively simple and quick to develop. System 
models can be extremely complex, and hence expensive to create. A simple but 
effective system model is essential to ensure a cost effective hazard analysis. 
The IOM model meets this requirement. Additionally, the interface hazard 
analysis technique must be able to keep pace with the evolution of the system of 
systems. The interface hazard analysis technique achieves this by using system 
models that are independent of other systems and an automated search process. 
In the event that a system is added, removed or modified, only that system model 
needs to be added, removed or modified; all other system models can remain the 
same. 
The technique also provides methods for assessing mishap risk and 
estimating the residual risk. The mishap risk is a function of its component 
elements, each of which has its own probability. The probabilities are assessed 
qualitatively, and combined using a qualitative probability scheme. The 
assessment of risk in this manner allows interface hazards to be compared 
directly with hazards identified by other techniques. 
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The size of a system of systems in combination with its virtually infinite 
configurations makes it impractical to conduct a complete system of systems 
hazard. For interface hazards, the residual mishap risk was assessed by 
considering known hazards, limiting the probability of unidentified hazards, and 
minimizing unknowns through effective techniques and qualified practitioners. 
Finally, a software application was developed for use in proving that the 
interface hazard analysis technique is valid. The software application was 
developed in a relatively short period of time and was relatively small in nature, 
but was successfully applied to the Ballistic Missile Defense System and 
successfully identified interface hazards.  
B. FUTURE WORK 
There are two major areas for further research. Firstly, the system of 
systems hazard taxonomy is not complete. There are other types of emergent 
hazards. This taxonomy needs to be further expanded and defined. The follow on 
from this is that techniques must be developed that identify and analyze each of 
these hazard types. This thesis proposes a technique for identifying only one 
hazard type. At the very least, four more hazard analysis techniques are 
required, though it may be possible that one technique could cover more than 
one hazard type. 
An assumption that was made regarding system of systems hazard 
analysis is that the analysis will never provide full coverage. That is, there are 
parts of a system of systems that will never be analyzed. Considering that there 
will be several hazard analysis techniques, and limited budgets, a decision may 
be required to perform one technique and not another. Such a decision should be 
based upon an assessment of which technique is most likely to identify the 
highest priority hazards. A method for determining the most effective technique 
for a given application should also be developed. 
The success of the interface hazard analysis technique depends largely 
upon the guide words that are used. A robust and proven set of guide words 
should be developed to ensure more accurate system models. 
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In addition, while the interface hazard analysis technique is capable of 
detecting hazards, this data needs to be integrated into the system safety 
requirements traceability matrix. 
A promising area of research is the application of formal specifications to 
system interfaces.39 These techniques may provide methods for preventing or 






















                                            
39 D.S. Caffal, and J.B. Michael, (2005) Formal Methods in a System-of-Systems 
Development. IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics. pp. 1856-1863. 
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APPENDIX A.  INTERFACE HAZARD ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE 
 
Figure 32. The Interface Hazard Analysis Technique 
 
Establish System List 
1. List all systems that may be part of the system of systems. 
Define System of Systems Architecture 
2. For each system pair, identify the connection that may occur as one 
of: 
(i) One to One (1:1) 
(ii) One to Many (1:n) 
(iii) Many to One (n:1) 
(iv) Many to Many (m:n) 
Define Guidewords and Network Terminology 
3. Define a standardized list of network terminology. Describe all 
system inputs and outputs in these terms. The network terminology should 
include options for each of the following: 
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(i) Transmission Path40 
(ii) Message Type (e.g. data, command) 
(iii) Message Name 
4. Define a list of guidewords that will be used to assess the inputs 
and outputs of a system. The guidewords describe the failures that the inputs 
and outputs may suffer. A quality set of guidewords is essential to the success of 
the technique. 
Define Mishap Lists 
5. List all mishaps for each system. 
Analyze Inputs 
6. List all inputs for each system using the network terminology. 
7. For each input, apply each guideword and determine the effect of 
the resultant failure on the outputs of the system. Consider multiple inputs as 
causes for single output failures and single input failures causing multiple output 
failures. If a link can be found, add it to the system model. Assess the probability 
of the link occurring. That is, the probability that the output failure occurs given 
that the input failure has occurred. 
8. For each input, apply each guideword and determine whether the 
resultant failure can cause one of the system mishaps. Consider multiple inputs 
combining to cause a mishap. If a link can be found, add it to the system model. 
Assess the probability of the link occurring, that is, the probability that the mishap 
will occur given that the input failure has occurred. 
Analyze Outputs 
9. For each output, apply each guideword and determine whether the 
resultant failure can be caused by a failure within the system. Consider multiple 
output failure occurring from a single set of system failures. Add all output 
                                            
40 All transmission paths must be considered, including in-band paths (e.g., defined 
interfaces) and out-band paths (e.g., voice communication to subvert system checks). 
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failures to the system model. Assess the probability of the output failure 
occurring, that is, the probability of the necessary system failures occurring and 
the probability of the system failures leading to the output failure. 
Analyze Network 
10. For each system, assemble a system model that consists of all 
identified: 
(i) Links between input failures and outputs failures, 
(ii) Links between input failures and mishaps, and 
(iii) Output failures caused by internal system failures. 
11. Construct a network analysis tree for each link between an input 
failure and a mishap. Assemble the tree out of links between input failures and 
output failures, and output failures caused by internal system failures. Continue 
constructing the tree until all tree branches terminate in an output failure caused 
by an internal system failure or to sufficient depth such that any hazards that 
remain unidentified have a maximum probability that is acceptable. 
12. Summarize the network analysis by creating a list of all identified 
interface hazards. 
Assess Mishap Risk 
13. Construct a table that applies the AND function to two qualitative 
probability levels. 
14. For each identified interface hazard, assess the mishap risk in 
terms of probability and consequence. Use the probabilities of the individual 
interface hazard elements and the qualitative probability combination table in 





Assess Residual Mishap Risk 
15. Once all risk mitigation activities have been conducted, assess the 
residual mishap risk in the system of systems due to interface hazards. Consider 
the following in the assessment: 
(i) Risk due to identified hazards, 
(ii) Risk due to hazards not covered by the extent of the network 
trees, and 
(iii) Risk due to hazards not identified due to shortfalls in the 
system models. 
Report Results 
10. Link the resultant artifacts from the hazard analysis back to the 
system safety requirement traceability matrix. 
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APPENDIX B.  QUALITATIVE PROBABILITY COMBINATIONS 
The Hazard Analysis process requires that engineers assign a qualitative 
value to the likelihood of an events occurrence. When dealing with a System of 
Systems, these events can be combined to form a single hazard. The probability 
of the hazard is a function of the probabilities of the component events. As each 
event is required for the hazard to occur, the probability of the hazard is 
assessed using the AND function. This appendix outlines how qualitative 
probabilities may be combined using the AND function. 
The probability of the hazard is defined as: 
P(Hazard) = P(Event1) AND P(Event2) AND … AND P(Eventn) 
Each event is assigned a qualitative probability in accordance with 
MIL-STD-882D. Qualitative probabilities are used because of the expense and 
difficulty of obtaining quantitative probabilities. The purpose of this assessment is 
to determine whether relative probability, that is whether one hazard has a higher 
probability than another, not absolute probability. 
Table 17 shows the qualitative probability levels from MIL-STD-882D. 
Columns (I) and (II) are taken directly from MIL-STD-882D. The description of 
each level includes a loose mathematical definition. The definition is not 
complete because it does not adequately describe the boundaries between 
probabilities. For example, it is unclear what the probability level would be for an 
event with probability 10-1. Column (III) has been added to indicate the two 
methods that can be used to fully define the spectrum of probabilities. A 
probability value on the boundary can either be assigned to the higher or lower 
probability level. Although the distinction may appear insignificant, a strict 








Frequent Likely to occur often within the life of 
an item, with a probability of 
occurrence greater than 10-1 in that 
life. 
1 ≥ P > 10-1 
or 
1 ≥ P ≥ 10-1 
Probable Will occur several times within the life 
of an item, with a probability 
occurrence less than 10-1 but greater 
than 10-2 in that life. 
10-1 ≥ P > 10-2 
or 
10-1 > P ≥ 10-2 
Occasional Likely to occur sometime in the life of 
an item, with a probability of 
occurrence less than 10-2 but greater 
than 10-3 in that life.  
10-2 ≥ P > 10-3 
or 
10-2 > P ≥ 10-3 
Remote Unlikely but possible to occur in the 
life of an item, with a probability of 
occurrence less than 10-3 but greater 
than 10-6 in that life. 
10-3 ≥ P > 10-6 
or 
10-3 > P ≥ 10-6 
Improbable So unlikely, it can be assumed 
occurrence may not be experienced, 
with a probability of occurrence less 
than 10-6 in that life. 
10-6 ≥ P ≥ 0 
or 
10-6 > P ≥ 0  
Table 17. MIL-STD-882D Mishap Probability Levels41 
 
There are six options for interpreting a qualitative probability numerically in 
order to combine with another qualitative probability and then map the result 
back to a qualitative probability. Each qualitative probability can be interpreted 
either as a worst case scenario, i.e., at the upper limit of the range, or a best 
case scenario at the lower limit of the range, or at some point between the two. 
When interpreting limits and mapping the result back to a qualitative probability, 
the limits can be interpreted conservatively and boundary probabilities assigned 
to the higher probability level, or optimistically and boundary probabilities 
                                            
41 MIL-STD-882D Standard Practice for System Safety (2000) §A.4.4.3.2.2. 
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assigned to the lower probability level. The result of each option is a table that 
details the result of applying the AND function to two qualitative probability levels. 
For example, using the optimistic interpretation, Frequent AND Probable 
results in: 





1 10 10 10








≥ > × ≥ >
× ≥ × > ×
≥ × >
 
Thus, the combination of Frequent AND Probable results in a probability 
ranging from, but not including, 10-3 up to and including 10-1. At the low end, a 
probability of just greater than 10-3 maps to a qualitative probability level of 
Occasional. At the high end, with a probability of 10-1, the probability level is 
Probable. This process can be repeated for each interpretation of the 
MIL-STD-882D limits to produce the upper and lower bounds shown in Table 18. 
In addition to the boundary conditions, a middle value may also be 
considered. That is, a value that is equally spaced between the upper and lower 
bounds of the probability level. Table 19 shows the middle values that will be 
used to analyze the middle ground of qualitative probability combinations. These 
middle values are then combined in Table 20. The interpretation of the values in 
Table 20 will depend upon whether the MIL-STD-882D limits are interpreted 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 18. Qualitative Probability Combinations - Limits 
Level Lower Limit Upper Limit Middle Value 
Frequent 10-1 100 10-0.5 
Probable 10-2 10-1 10-1.5 
Occasional 10-3 10-2 10-2.5 
Remote 10-6 10-3 10-4.5 
Improbable 0 10-6 10-7.5 
Table 19. Qualitative Probability Levels – Middle Values 
 
AND Frequent Probable Occasional Remote Improbable
Frequent 10-1 10-2 10-3 10-5 10-8 
Probable 10-2 10-3 10-4 10-6 10-9 
Occasional 10-3 10-4 10-5 10-7 10-10 
Remote 10-5 10-6 10-7 10-9 10-12 
Improbable 10-8 10-9 10-10 10-12 10-15 
Table 20. Qualitative Probability Combinations – Middle Values 
 
The data now exists for six tables that define six different interpretations of 
the MIL-STD-882D probability levels. However, when the results of the boundary 
conditions are compared back to either the conservative or optimistic 
interpretations of the probability ranges, the differences resolve themselves and 
the qualitative probability combination tables become identical. As such, there 
are only four possible tables. The choice of one particular table for use within a 
specific application is a judgment call that must be made within a specific system 
safety context. However, each of the tables is distinguishable in terms of the 
average probability level of the results. Each table has the same level of input, 
that is, the same twenty-five probability combinations are used for all four tables. 
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The average probabilities of the outputs of each table can then be used to 
determine whether one table is more conservative or optimistic than another, 
which will aide the choice of table for a specific application. If the application 
places a large emphasis on safety, a more conservative table should be chosen. 
To compute the average probability, each probability level is assigned a numeric 
value (1 for Improbable through 5 for Frequent). The higher the average 
probability, the more conservative the table is. The four possible tables are 
shown in Table 21 through Table 24 and are shown in order from the most 
optimistic to the most conservative. 
 
AND Frequent Probable Occasional Remote Improbable
Frequent Probable Occasional Remote Improbable Improbable 
Probable Occasional Remote Remote Improbable Improbable 
Occasional Remote Remote Remote Improbable Improbable 
Remote Improbable Improbable Improbable Improbable Improbable 
Improbable Improbable Improbable Improbable Improbable Improbable 
Table 21. Qualitative Probability Combinations – Lower Limit – Average 
Risk 1.52  
 
AND Frequent Probable Occasional Remote Improbable
Frequent Probable Occasional Remote Remote Improbable 
Probable Occasional Remote Remote Improbable Improbable 
Occasional Remote Remote Remote Improbable Improbable 
Remote Remote Improbable Improbable Improbable Improbable 
Improbable Improbable Improbable Improbable Improbable Improbable 
Table 22. Qualitative Probability Combinations – Middle Values, 
Optimistic Interpretation – Average Risk 1.60  
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AND Frequent Probable Occasional Remote Improbable
Frequent Frequent Probable Occasional Remote Improbable 
Probable Probable Occasional Remote Remote Improbable 
Occasional Occasional Remote Remote Improbable Improbable 
Remote Remote Remote Improbable Improbable Improbable 
Improbable Improbable Improbable Improbable Improbable Improbable 
Table 23. Qualitative Probability Combinations – Middle Values, 
Conservative Interpretation – Average Risk 1.92  
 
AND Frequent Probable Occasional Remote Improbable
Frequent Frequent Probable Occasional Remote Improbable 
Probable Probable Occasional Remote Remote Improbable 
Occasional Occasional Remote Remote Remote Improbable 
Remote Remote Remote Remote Improbable Improbable 
Improbable Improbable Improbable Improbable Improbable Improbable 
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APPENDIX C.  BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM 
OVERVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
In order to explore the nature of systems of systems hazards and to 
validate any hazard analysis techniques in a practical manner, a case study is 
required. For the purposes of this research, the Ballistic Missile Defense System 
will be used to demonstrate hazard types and to assess hazard analysis 
techniques. 
The ballistic missile defense program was initiated in 2002 in response to 
the threat posed by several developing nations that possessed simple, single 
warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles. An evolutionary acquisition strategy 
has been employed and the scope of the program has grown to include all types 
of ballistic missile threats. The composition of the Ballistic Missile Defense 
System will grow and change in the coming years as new systems are acquired 
and integrated. 
The Ballistic Missile Defense System is a true system of systems. It 
employs a variety of systems in a distributed network that cooperate to complete 
system of systems goal. The state of the system of systems can change 
dynamically as systems either join the network, or depart to perform other roles. 
The Ballistic Missile Defense System is arguably the largest, most complex and 
most expensive defense program ever undertaken. 
B. PURPOSE 
According to the Missile Defense Agency: 
[t]he fundamental objective of the Ballistic Missile Defense program 
is to develop the capability to defend forces and territories of the 
United States, its allies and friends against all classes and ranges 
of ballistic missile threats.42 
                                            
42 BMD Basics – Overview Retrieved February 27, 2007 from 
http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/html/basics.html. 
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The operational concept for the Ballistic Missile Defense System is a 
layered defense that provides the capability to strike against ballistic missiles in 
the boost, midcourse and terminal phases. At each phase, the commander of the 
Ballistic Missile Defense System has several options for destroying the threat 
ballistic missile.43 The layered defense structure is shown in Figure 33. 
 
 
Figure 33. Ballistic Missile Defense System Layered Defense Structure44 
 
Each of the threat missile phases presents different challenges and 
advantages. In the boost phase, the missile is at its lowest velocity (it may even 
be stationary) and is hence easiest to hit. However, launch sites of the threat 
missile can vary greatly geographically and the missile does not remain in the 
boost phase for long, requiring an early detection and a rapid response. During 
the midcourse phase, the missile is moving significantly faster than during the 
boost phase, but the altitude of the missile means that collateral damage is highly 
unlikely and hence less discriminate weapons can be used. In the terminal 
phase, the missile is moving faster still, but the location of the missile is 
geographically restricted to the location of the United States, its allies and their 
forces. No phase represents the optimal solution, each has significant 
challenges. As such, the Ballistic Missile Defense System aims to engage threat 
missiles in all phases of flight. 
                                            
43 Missile Defense Agency. (2005). A Day in the Life of the BMDS (3rd Ed). 
44 After Ibid. 
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C. SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE 
The architecture of the Ballistic Missile Defense System is fairly simple. It 
employs a range of sensors and engagement options that are paired by several 
command and control centers. There is no rigid structure, and the network 
permits any sensor to be linked to any engagement option. This architecture is 
shown in Figure 34.  
 
 
Figure 34. Ballistic Missile Defense System Architecture 
 
In the architecture shown in Figure 34, there are four sensor systems and 
four weapon systems that integrate into the Ballistic Missile Defense System 
through two command and control centers. Some weapon systems, Weapon1 
and Weapon3, are linked to both command and control centers, the other 
systems are linked to only one center. In the example shown, Sensor4 detects 
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the threat missile and notifies CandC1. CandC1 allocates Weapon1 to engage the 
threat missile, and creates a link between Weapon1 and Sensor4. This is an 
overly simplified example, the threat missile is likely to be detected by several  
 
sensors, and several weapons will be assigned to engage the threat missile (at 
least one for each phase of flight), but it serves to show how the Ballistic Missile 
Defense System network is created and operates. 
D. COMPONENT SYSTEMS 
1. Command and Control, Battle Management and 
Communications 
The Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications 
element is the backbone of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. Its purpose is to 
ensure the flow of critical information between system elements by tracking all 
potential ballistic missile threats, directing weapon systems to engage threat 
missiles and pairing weapons systems with sensor systems to engage threat 
missiles in all phases of flight. The Command and Control, Battle Management 
and Communications element consists of four major subsystems: Situational 
Awareness, Planner, Battle Management and Network. Together, these 
subsystems: 
provide the Ballistic Missile Defense System with planning 
capability to optimally locate sensors and weapon systems to 
counter identified threats; situational awareness of the evolving 
battle and status of defensive assets at all leadership levels; sensor 
netting to detect identify, track and discriminate threats; global 
integrated fire control to pair the right sensors and weapon systems 
against multiple threats for the highest probability of kill and to best 
manage a relatively limited shot magazine; and global 
communications networks to efficiently manage and distribute 
essential data.45 
                                            
45 Missile Defense Agency. (2005). A Day in the Life of the BMDS (3rd Ed), p. 15. 
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Figure 35. Command and Control, Battle Management and 
Communications Control Center46 
 
2. Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 
Aegis destroyers were originally developed to provide a forward air to 
surface capability for the protection of aircraft carriers, in particular to counter the 
air to surface anti-ship missile threat. They have been modified to perform the 
role of both sensor and weapon system within the Ballistic Missile Defense 
System. A Long Range Surveillance and Track capability is added to Aegis 
destroyers to allow Aegis to trigger other Ballistic Missile Defense System 
sensors, and to provide track data to ground-based midcourse defense elements. 
Aegis destroyers so equipped are forward deployed to extend the battle space 
and provide early warning. 
In addition to their primary role as sensors, Aegis destroyers can be 
outfitted with the Standard Missile-3 which allows them to engage short and 
medium range ballistic missiles. This capability is currently considered an 
emergency capability only. The role of Aegis is expected to evolve and increase 
as new technologies are tested and employed.47 
                                            
46 Missile Defense Agency. (2005). A Day in the Life of the BMDS (3rd Ed), p. 14. 
47 Ibid., p. 17. 
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Figure 36. Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense48 
 
3. Airborne Laser 
The airborne laser is a megawatt-class, chemical oxygen iodine laser 
mounted on a Boeing 747 aircraft that is capable of destroying ballistic missiles 
at a distance of several hundred kilometers. The airborne laser engages threat 
ballistic missiles in the boost phase only. In addition to its engagement capability, 
the airborne laser also carries six infrared sensors that are used to detect the 
heat plume from a ballistic missile launch. The airborne laser is also capable of 
receiving target coordinates from the command and control centers. At the time 
of writing, the laser had been successfully fired to sufficient power and duration 
on the ground, and the aircraft platform with the laser controls and sensors has 
been successfully test flown, but the full system has not been tested.49 
                                            
48 From Program Images Retrieved February 27, 2007 from 
http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/html/nmdimg.html#fm6.ANC. 
49 Missile Defense Agency. (2005). A Day in the Life of the BMDS (3rd Ed), p. 19. 
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Figure 37. Airborne Laser50 
 
4. Forward-Based X-Band Radar 
The Forward-Based X-Band Radar is used to detect ballistic missile 
threats and provide precise tracking information to the Ballistic Missile Defense 
System. It is able to track ballistic missiles in the boost phase, discriminate 
between threat and non-threat projectiles and pass track data to the Ballistic 
Missile Defense System for engagement by midcourse and terminal weapon 
systems. It can either scan autonomously or be cued by other sensor systems.51 
 
                                            
50 From Program Images Retrieved February 27, 2007 from 
http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/html/nmdimg.html#fm6.ANC. 
51 Missile Defense Agency. (2005). A Day in the Life of the BMDS (3rd Ed), p. 21. 
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Figure 38. Forward-Based X-Band Radar52 
 
5. Ballistic Missile Defense System Space Systems 
The Ballistic Missile Defense System will employ several space-based 
sensors, though this capability is limited at present. The intent of the space 
systems sensors is to employ infrared and optical sensors to track ballistic 
missile threats through all phases of flight and to hand off track data to command 
and control elements for threat missile engagement. In addition, the Missile 
Defense Agency is currently exploring the economic feasibility of deploying a 
space-based interceptor. Such a weapon would not be limited by geography like 
land, sea and air-based interceptors.53 
6. Ground-based Midcourse Defense 
The ground-based midcourse defense system is designed to detect, track 
and engage intermediate and long range ballistic missiles in the midcourse 
phase of flight. Unlike other Ballistic Missile Defense System elements, the 
ground-based midcourse defense element is a command and control center, 
sensor and weapon system. It is able to engage ballistic missile threats without 
the support of the remaining elements, or it can provide sensor and weapon 
options to the larger system of systems. The ground-based midcourse defense                                             
52 From Missile Defense Agency. (2005). A Day in the Life of the BMDS (3rd Ed), p. 20. 
53 Ibid., p. 23. 
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element utilizes other system sensors as well as adding a sea-based X-band 
radar. A ground-based interceptor is used to engage ballistic missiles in the 
midcourse phase at high altitudes and speeds. The booster places an 
exoatmospheric kill vehicle on a collision path with the threat missile. The kill 
vehicle uses kinetic energy to destroy the incoming threat.54 
7. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense element provides a regional 
defense against threat ballistic missiles. It receives tracking data from the 
Ballistic Missile Defense System and is capable of launching a kinetic energy kill 
vehicle that can destroy ballistic missiles in all phases of flight, either within or 
just outside the atmosphere. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense element 
also tracks the threat missile and guides the kill vehicle to impact.55 
 
 
Figure 39. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense56 
 
8. Multiple Kill Vehicles 
Multiple kill vehicles are designed specifically to counter the threat of 
ballistic missiles with multiple, independent re-entry vehicles. A multiple kill 
                                            
54 Missile Defense Agency. (2005). A Day in the Life of the BMDS (3rd Ed), p. 25. 
55 Ibid., p. 27. 
56 From Program Images Retrieved February 27, 2007 from 
http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/html/nmdimg.html#fm6.ANC. 
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vehicle is a carrier vehicle that boosts several kill vehicles into orbit in order to 
engage threat missiles in the midcourse phase of flight. Each kill vehicle is 
independently targeted and the carrier vehicle has the ability to assign targets to 
kill vehicles in flight. It is intended that multiple kill vehicles will be compatible with 
the ground-based midcourse defense boosters and potentially the Standard 
Missile-3. Multiple kill vehicles rely on the Ballistic Missile Defense System for 
target track data.57 
9. Patriot Advanced Capability-3 
The Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missile system is a terminal defense 
weapon that provides a regional defense against ballistic missiles in the terminal 
phase of flight. The Patriot system has been successfully employed in operations 
in the Middle East. Patriot will be used to defend mobile and forward deployed 
forces. It relies on the Ballistic Missile Defense System for threat detection, but is 
able to track threat missiles that are in range of its radars.58 
10. Kinetic Energy Interceptors 
Although not yet developed, the purpose of the kinetic energy interceptor 
program is to develop next generation, kinetic energy kill vehicles that can 
engage threat ballistic missiles in the boost and midcourse phases of flight. 
Kinetic energy interceptors will be both land and sea-based and will integrate 
with current and future delivery platforms.59 
E. SYSTEM EVOLUTION 
The Missile Defense Agency has employed an evolutionary acquisition 
model in the development of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. After the initial 
acquisition of core components, block upgrades are performed on a two year 
cycle. Each block has a specific scope for upgrading the Ballistic Missile Defense 
System capability.60 The scope, functions and hazards of the Ballistic Missile 
Defense System, as a system of systems, will change over time. Any hazard 
                                            
57 Missile Defense Agency. (2005). A Day in the Life of the BMDS (3rd Ed), p. 29. 
58 Ibid., p. 31. 
59 Ibid., p. 33. 
60 Ibid., p. 9. 
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analysis technique must be capable of keeping pace with the evolution of the 
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APPENDIX D.  BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM CASE 
STUDY DATA 
The following tables contain attribute values developed by the author. The 
values do not necessarily correspond to those values assigned by the Missile 
Defense Agency. 
System Mishap Consequence
Radiation causes harm to 
personnel 
Critical 
Radiation causes harm to 
property 
Critical 
Missile exhaust causes harm to 
personnel 
Critical 
Missile impacts friendly system Catastrophic 
Missile impacts friendly building Catastrophic 
Missile impacts friendly terrain Marginal 
Aegis Destroyer 
Missile impacts hostile terrain Negligible61 
Laser destroys friendly system Catastrophic 
Laser radiates friendly system Critical 
Airborne Laser 
Laser radiates friendly building Critical 
Radiation causes harm to 
personnel 
Critical Forward-based X-Band 
Radar 
Radiation causes harm to 
property 
Critical 
                                            
61 This is not just an operational mishap. Damage to hostile property and personnel fall within 
the purview of operational hazards, however, the impact could also cause environmental damage 
and hence must be considered a system safety mishap. 
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System Mishap Consequence
Missile exhaust causes harm to 
personnel 
Critical 
Missile impacts friendly system Catastrophic 
Missile impacts friendly building Catastrophic 
Missile impacts friendly terrain Marginal 
Ground-based Midcourse 
Interceptors 
Missile impacts hostile terrain Negligible 
Missile exhaust causes harm to 
personnel 
Critical 
Missile impacts friendly system Catastrophic 
Missile impacts friendly building Catastrophic 
Missile impacts friendly terrain Negligible 
Kinetic Energy 
Interceptor 
Missile impacts hostile terrain Negligible 
Multiple Kill Vehicles Missile exhaust causes harm to 
personnel 
Critical 
Missile exhaust causes harm to 
personnel 
Critical 
Missile impacts friendly system Catastrophic 
Missile impacts friendly building Catastrophic 
Missile impacts friendly terrain Marginal 
Patriot Advanced 
Capability-3 
Missile impacts hostile terrain Negligible 
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System Mishap Consequence
Radiation causes harm to 
personnel 
Critical Sea-based X-Band 
Radar 
Radiation causes harm to 
property 
Critical 
Missile exhaust causes harm to 
personnel 
Critical 
Missile impacts friendly system Catastrophic 
Missile impacts friendly building Catastrophic 
Missile impacts friendly terrain Marginal 
Terminal High Altitude 
Area Defense 
Missile impacts hostile terrain Negligible 
Table 25. Ballistic Missile Defense System Component System Mishaps 
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System Input 
Network Command Cue 
Network Command Fire 
Network Data Target Track 
Network Data Target Type 
Aegis Destroyer 
Voice Command Fire 
Network Command Fire 
Network Data Target Track 
Network Data Target Type 
Airborne Laser 
Voice Command Fire 
Network Data System Location 
Network  Data System Status 
Network Data Target Detected 
Network Data Target Track 
Network Data Target Type 
Command and Control Center 
Voice Data Target Detected 
Network Command Cue 
Network Data Target Track 
Forward-based X-Band Radar 
Network Data Target Type 
Network Command Fire 
Network Data Target Track 
Ground-based Midcourse Interceptor 
Network Data Target Type 
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System Input 
Voice Command Fire 
Network Command Fire 
Network Data Target Track 
Network Data Target Type 
Kinetic Energy Interceptors 
Voice Command Fire 
Network Command Fire 
Network Data Target Track 
Network Data Target Type 
Multiple Kill Vehicles 
Voice Command Fire 
Network Command Fire 
Network Data Target Track 
Network Data Target Type 
Patriot Advanced Capability-3 
Voice Command Fire 
Network Command Cue 
Network Data Target Track 
Sea-based X-Band Radar 
Network Data Target Type 
Network Command Cue 
Network Data Target Track 
Space-based Sensors 
Network Data Target Type 
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System Input 
Network Command Fire 
Network Data Target Track 
Network Data Target Type 
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
Voice Command Fire 
Table 26. Ballistic Missile Defense System Component System Inputs 
 
System Output 
Network Command Cue 
Network Data System Location 
Network Data System Status 
Network Data Target Detected 
Network Data Target Track 
Network Data Target Type 
Aegis Destroyer 
Voice Data Target Detected 
Network Command Cue 
Network Data System Location 
Network Data System Status 
Network Data Target Detected 
Network Data Target Track 
Network Data Target Type 
Airborne Laser 
Voice Data Target Detected 
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System Output 
Network Command Cue 
Network Command Fire 
Network Data Target Detected 
Network Data Target Track 
Network Data Target Type 
Command and Control Center 
Voice Command Fire 
Network Command Cue 
Network Data System Location 
Network Data System Status 
Network Data Target Detected 
Network Data Target Track 
Network Data Target Type 
Forward-based X-Band Radar 
Voice Data Target Detected 
Network Data System Location Ground-based Midcourse Interceptors 
Network Data System Status 
Network Data System Location Kinetic Energy Interceptors 
Network Data System Status 
Network Data System Location Multiple Kill Vehicles 
Network Data System Status 
Network Data System Location Patriot Advanced Capability-3 
Network Data System Status 
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System Output 
Network Command Cue 
Network Data System Location 
Network Data System Status 
Network Data Target Detected 
Network Data Target Track 
Network Data Target Type 
Sea-based X-Band Radar 
Voice Data Target Detected 
Network Command Cue 
Network Data System Location 
Network Data System Status 
Network Data Target Detected 
Network Data Target Track 
Space-based Sensors 
Network Data Target Type 
Network Data System Location Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
Network Data System Status 
Table 27. Ballistic Missile Defense System Component Systems Outputs 
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Input Mishap Probability 
Network Command Cue 
Commission 
Radiation Causes Harm to 
Personnel 
Remote 
Network Command Cue 
Commission 
Radiation Causes Harm to 
Property 
Remote 
Network Command Fire 
Commission 
Missile Exhaust Causes Harm 
to Personnel 
Occasional 
Network Data Target Track 
Subtle Incorrect 
Missile Impacts Friendly 
Building 
Improbable 
Network Data Target Track 
Subtle Incorrect 
Missile Impacts Friendly 
Terrain 
Remote 
Network Data Target Track 
Subtle Incorrect 
Missile Impacts Hostile Terrain Probable 
Network Data Target Type 
Subtle Incorrect 
Missile Impacts Friendly 
System 
Probable 
Voice Command Fire 
Commission 
Missile Exhaust Causes Harm 
to Personnel 
Remote 
Table 28. Aegis Destroyer Links from Input to Mishap 
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Output Probability 
Network Command Cue Commission Remote 
Network Data System Location Subtle Incorrect Occasional 
Network Data System Status Subtle Incorrect Remote 
Network Data Target Detected Commission Probable 
Network Data Target Track Subtle Incorrect Occasional 
Network Data Target Type Subtle Incorrect Probable 
Voice Data Target Detected Commission Occasional 
Table 29. Aegis Destroyer Failed Outputs 
 
Input Mishap Probability 
Network Data Target Track 
Subtle Incorrect 
Laser radiates friendly system Remote 
Network Data Target Track 
Subtle Incorrect 
Laser radiates friendly building Remote 
Network Data Target Type 
Subtle Incorrect 
Laser destroys friendly system Probable 




Network Command Cue Commission Remote 
Network Data System Location Subtle Incorrect Occasional 
Network Data System Status Subtle Incorrect Remote 
Network Data Target Detected Commission Remote 
Network Data Target Track Subtle Incorrect Occasional 
Network Data Target Type Subtle Incorrect Remote 
Voice Data Target Detected Commission Improbable 
Table 31. Airborne Laser Failed Outputs 
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Input Output Probability 
Network Data Target 
Detected Commission 
Network Command Cue 
Commission 
Probable 
Network Data Target 
Detected Commission 
Network Command Fire 
Commission 
Occasional 
Network Data Target 
Detected Commission 
Voice Command Fire 
Commission 
Remote 
Network Data Target Track 
Subtle Incorrect 
Network Data Target Track 
Subtle Incorrect 
Frequent 
Network Data Target Type 
Subtle Incorrect 
Network Data Target Type 
Subtle Incorrect 
Probable 
Voice Data Target Detected 
Commission 
Network Command Cue 
Commission 
Frequent 
Voice Data Target Detected 
Commission 
Network Command Fire 
Commission 
Occasional 
Voice Data Target Detected 
Commission 
Voice Command Fire 
Commission 
Occasional 
Table 32. Command and Control Center Links from Inputs to Outputs 
Input Mishap Probability 
Network Command Cue 
Commission 
Radiation Causes Harm to 
Personnel 
Remote 
Network Command Cue 
Commission 
Radiation Causes Harm to 
Property 
Improbable 
Table 33. Forward-based X-Band Radar Links from Input to Mishap 
 
Output Probability 
Network Command Cue Commission Occasional 
Network Data System Location Subtle Incorrect Improbable 
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Network Data System Status Subtle Incorrect Remote 
Network Data Target Detected Commission Remote 
Network Data Target Track Subtle Incorrect Occasional 
Network Data Target Type Subtle Incorrect Occasional 
Voice Data Target Detected Commission Remote 
Table 34. Forward-based X-Band Radar Failed Outputs 
 
 126
Input Mishap Probability 
Network Command Fire 
Commission 
Missile Exhaust Causes Harm 
to Personnel 
Occasional 
Network Data Target Track 
Subtle Incorrect 
Missile Impacts Friendly 
Building 
Improbable 
Network Data Target Track 
Subtle Incorrect 
Missile Impacts Friendly 
Terrain 
Improbable 
Network Data Target Track 
Subtle Incorrect 
Missile Impacts Hostile Terrain Improbable 
Network Data Target Type 
Subtle Incorrect 
Missile Impacts Friendly 
System 
Probable 
Voice Command Fire 
Commission 
Missile Exhaust Causes Harm 
to Personnel 
Occasional 
Table 35. Ground-based Midcourse Interceptors Links from Input to 
Mishap 
 
Input Mishap Probability 
Network Command Fire 
Commission 
Missile Exhaust Causes Harm 
to Personnel 
Remote 
Network Data Target Track 
Subtle Incorrect 
Missile Impacts Friendly 
Building 
Remote 
Network Data Target Track 
Subtle Incorrect 
Missile Impacts Friendly 
Terrain 
Occasional 
Network Data Target Track 
Subtle Incorrect 
Missile Impacts Hostile Terrain Occasional 
Network Data Target Type 
Subtle Incorrect 
Missile Impacts Friendly 
System 
Occasional 
Voice Command Fire 
Commission 
Missile Exhaust Causes Harm 
to Personnel 
Remote 
Table 36. Kinetic Energy Interceptors Links from Input to Mishap 
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Input Mishap Probability 
Network Command Fire 
Commission 
Missile Exhaust Causes Harm 
to Personnel 
Improbable 
Voice Command Fire 
Commission 
Missile Exhaust Causes Harm 
to Personnel 
Remote 
Table 37. Multiple Kill Vehicles Links from Input to Mishap 
 
Input Mishap Probability 
Network Command Fire 
Commission 
Missile Exhaust Causes Harm 
to Personnel 
Remote 
Network Data Target Track 
Subtle Incorrect 
Missile Impacts Friendly 
Building 
Occasional 
Network Data Target Track 
Subtle Incorrect 
Missile Impacts Friendly 
Terrain 
Probable 
Network Data Target Track 
Subtle Incorrect 
Missile Impacts Hostile Terrain Improbable 
Network Data Target Type 
Subtle Incorrect 
Missile Impacts Friendly 
System 
Frequent 
Voice Command Fire 
Commission 
Missile Exhaust Causes Harm 
to Personnel 
Occasional 
Table 38. Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Links from Input to Mishap 
 
Input Mishap Probability 
Network Command Cue 
Commission 
Radiation Causes Harm to 
Personnel 
Occasional 
Network Command Cue 
Commission 
Radiation Causes Harm to 
Property 
Improbable 
Table 39. Sea-based X-Band Radar Links from Input to Mishap 
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Output Probability 
Network Command Cue Commission Occasional 
Network Data System Location Subtle Incorrect Occasional 
Network Data System Status Subtle Incorrect Remote 
Network Data Target Detected Commission Remote 
Network Data Target Track Subtle Incorrect Probable 
Network Data Target Type Subtle Incorrect Occasional 
Voice Data Target Detected Commission Remote 
Table 40. Sea-based X-Band Radar Failed Outputs 
 
Output Probability 
Network Command Cue Commission Remote 
Network Data System Location Subtle Incorrect Remote 
Network Data System Status Subtle Incorrect Remote 
Network Data Target Detected Commission Occasional 
Network Data Target Track Subtle Incorrect Probable 
Network Data Target Type Subtle Incorrect Occasional 
Table 41. Space-based Sensors Failed Outputs 
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Input Mishap Probability 
Network Command Fire 
Commission 
Missile Exhaust Causes Harm 
to Personnel 
Occasional 
Network Data Target Track 
Subtle Incorrect 
Missile Impacts Friendly 
Building 
Occasional 
Network Data Target Track 
Subtle Incorrect 
Missile Impacts Friendly 
Terrain 
Probable 
Network Data Target Track 
Subtle Incorrect 
Missile Impacts Hostile Terrain Remote 
Network Data Target Type 
Subtle Incorrect 
Missile Impacts Friendly 
System 
Occasional 
Voice Command Fire 
Commission 
Missile Exhaust Causes Harm 
to Personnel 
Probable 
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